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There is a lot of concern about the outflow of skilled medical professionals partic-
ularly physicians, from the developing to the developed world (WHO, 2006). Mullan
(2005) estimates that between 23 percent and 28 percent of practicing physicians in
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia are physicians trained
in other countries; with between 40 to 75 percent of these coming from lower-income
countries. This has raised the specter of shortages in these sending countries, many
of which already have an inadequate number of health professionals based on ratios
defined by the World Health Organization. Even though there is widespread agree-
ment that the patterns and magnitude of physician migration are worrying, there is
much less agreement over what should be done about it. This is due, at least in part,
to the fact that there is still considerable uncertainty as to what the key drivers of
international physician migration are. A number of studies (see for example Hagopian
et al., 2005; Astor et al., 2005) have spotlighted different factors ranging from better
training opportunities in destination countries to poor working conditions in source
countries but the relative contributions of each are still far from clear. This gap in
the literature is what has given rise to the first two of my three dissertation papers.
In both of these papers I attempt to provide causal estimates of the impact of some
of these push factors.
In my first paper I investigate the impact of short-term economic shocks on physi-
cian migration using a new panel dataset on the annual outflow of physicians from 31
Sub-Saharan African countries to the United States and the UK. This dataset covers
the period from 1975 to 2004. The question I attempt to answer in this paper is “to
what extent does physician emigration respond to changes in economic conditions
in source countries”. I estimate distributed-lag regressions of log migration on eco-
nomic growth, including country fixed effects and controlling for country-specific time
trends. To account for omitted variable bias and measurement error, I instrument
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economic growth using rainfall and changes in terms of trade. Overall I find a signif-
icant effect of economic conditions: a one percentage point decline in lagged growth
increases physician out-migration by approximately 0.3 percent. The IV estimates are
larger, suggesting that estimates from the fixed effects models are biased downwards.
In the IV models, a one percentage point decline in lagged growth increases physician
out-migration by between 3.4 and 3.6 percent.
In my second paper, I tackle another commonly mentioned push factor - low
wages. Many policy experts and researchers have argued that low wages (relative
to their counterparts in more developed countries) are probably the most important
factor contributing to the increasing emigration of health professionals from poor
countries (see for example Dovlo and Martineau, 2004). This has naturally led to a
call to increase the compensation of health professionals in developing countries. In
this paper, I exploit a “natural experiment” to identify the causal impact of wages
on physician emigration. The Ghanaian Government in 1998 instituted a scheme
known as the Additional Duty Hours Allowance (ADHA) Scheme which compensated
doctors for any additional hours worked beyond the standard 40 hours a week/160
hours a month. Estimates suggest that the ADHA scheme increased doctors incomes
in Ghana by between 75-150 percent. Using innovative new methods developed by
Abadie et al. (2007) and applying it to physician stock data collected by Docquier
et al. (2007), I find that by 2004 - six years after the program was instituted - the
foreign stock of Ghanaian physicians had reduced by about 10 percent and attribute
this directly to the effect of the ADHA program.
In my third paper I examine the demand for preventive care. Cervical cancer is the
most common cancer among women in developing countries. Of the roughly 273,000
deaths from cervical cancer worldwide in 2002, nearly 80 percent of these deaths
occurred in developing countries. Despite compelling evidence that cervical cancer
screening has reduced morbidity and mortality in developed countries, screening rates
in many developing countries are still very low. In this paper I examine the importance
of demand-side factors on take-up of cervical screening. Using a randomized design, I
test for the impact of price. I also test for the impact of receiving a conditional cancer
treatment subsidy. Overall I find a quantitatively and qualitatively significant impact
of both interventions. A N10 increase in price of screening reduced take-up of the
program by between 7 and 8 percentage points while women selected to receive the




African Doctor Migration: Are Economic Shocks
to Blame?
2.1 Introduction
There aren’t very many topics in the health policy arena that generate as much
buzz as the issue of health professional migration.1 It is clearly not a new phenomenon,
judging from some of the earlier published work (see for example Jonish, 1971; Mejia,
1978) but within the last couple of years it has become the de rigueur topic within
international/global health policy circles. No less a publication than the 2006 World
Health Organization (WHO) Report was devoted to discussing the current crisis in
the global health workforce and the role of health professional migration. A legitimate
question then to ask might be why this resurgence of interest in health professional
migration?
There are probably a couple of answers to this. One is that the rate of emigra-
tion seems to have accelerated over the last two decades. Hagopian et al. (2005)
estimate that the number of physicians in the US from Nigeria and Ghana, (two
major exporters of physicians to the US from sub-Saharan Africa) increased by more
than 1,000 percent between 1981 and 2002. Labonte et al. (2006) document a similar
phenomenon for Canada albeit not as striking.
The extent of migration is significant. Nearly 61 percent of all doctors produced
in Ghana between 1985 and 1994 were in the US or the United Kingdom by 1998
(Dovlo and Nyonator, 1999). In a different paper, Hagopian et al. (2004) estimate
that about 20 percent of Uganda’s doctors and 43 percent of Liberia’s physicians
were working in the US or Canada by 2002. More recent data, which include many
more destination countries, present an even more pessimistic picture. Clemens (2007)
1Sometimes referred to in the more popular media as medical brain drain.
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shows that more than a quarter of all African countries (16 out of 53) in the year
2000 had at least 50 percent of their doctors living overseas.
Many experts believe that health professional migration has a variety of nega-
tive effects on the country of origin (see discussion in Hagopian et al., 2005) though
one recent paper has questioned that assumption (Clemens, 2007). Clemens argues
forcefully that we need to re-examine the assumption that migration of health pro-
fessionals somehow reduces welfare in the country of origin. In his analysis, he shows
that the poor health outcomes in many African countries, arguably one of the key
concerns, may have little to do with the migration of health professionals from those
countries. Clearly, the jury is still out on whether health professional migration has
net negative welfare effects and a lot of research still remains to be done.
In this paper I sidestep the issue of whether migration has adverse effects on the
sending country and instead focus on why health professionals might be emigrating in
increasing numbers. This is an interesting question in its own right and has tremen-
dous policy significance; but should one need further motivation, I argue that since
many countries have revealed a strong preference to want to reduce the outflow of
health professionals, then this is a sufficient condition to motivate research that seeks
to understand how to help them do so. There is mounting evidence that from the
perspective of developing countries the question is not whether something should be
done about migration of health professionals, it is what. To the extent that we ac-
cept this as a guide, research that improves our understanding of the causes of health
professional migration is critical.
When it comes to the question of why health professionals migrate, there is no
shortage of candidate answers. Surveys of health professionals suggest several po-
tential explanations, ranging from worsening economic conditions, poor working con-
ditions and low salaries, to political instability and poor governance (Astor et al.,
2005; Awases et al., 2004). Surprisingly however, there has been very little system-
atic testing of these alternative explanations and it remains unclear the extent to
which many of these factors explain observed emigration rates. In this paper I test
whether adverse economic outcomes in countries of origin lead to increased migration
of health professionals. I focus on physician emigration from sub-Saharan Africa to
two popular destinations, the US and the UK. In Figure 2.1 below, I graph physician
migration over time for the 31 countries in my sample.
Notice that 2003 is somewhat of an outlier. It is driven by a more than 3-fold
increase in emigration from South Africa to the UK between 2002 and 2003. This
sharp increase was likely a response by South African doctors to changes to the UK
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Figure 2.1: Physician Emigration Trends (1975-2004)
Medical Act. Prior to 2003 the Medical Act allowed doctors with qualifications from
certain universities in Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and
South Africa a direct route to full or provisional registration. Following changes to
the Medical Act which were to take effect from 31 December 2003, they in common
with all other doctors who did not benefit from the freedom of movement provisions of
European law, would now have to provide additional evidence of their capability for
practice, which at a minimum involved taking a test of their professional knowledge
and skill.2 As will become clear later on this does not present a problem for my
analysis. Overall, the graph provides some evidence that physician migration has
increased. The number of physicians migrating trended upwards until around 2000.
It has declined somewhat since then.
2.2 Economic Shocks and Migration
There is a fairly extensive literature on the economics of migration: Borjas (1994)
provides a nice overview. Even though much of the empirical literature is focused
on economic outcomes (of migrant and domestic workers) and the role of selection
and skills, and less so on the determinants of migration, there is some evidence that
2Personal communication received from the General Medical Council
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economic conditions in countries of origin play a role in migration. Borjas (1987)
shows that there is a negative correlation between origin country incomes per capita
and migration to the US, Karemera et al. (2000) document a similar finding using
panel data on migration to the US between 1976 and 1986.
A different subset of studies has looked at return migration: Yang (2006) for
example shows that the return migration of Filipino workers abroad is sensitive to
fluctuations in the exchange rate, while Docquier et al. (2007) show that skilled
workers appear to be more likely to return to their home countries after the home
country experiences periods of sustained economic growth. See also work by Hatton
and Williamson (2003) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) both of which show a pos-
itive correlation between economic conditions and in-migration. Even though these
latter studies deal with return migration, they certainly raise the possibility that
out-migration may also be responsive to economic shocks.
Many people also believe that economic conditions in developing countries con-
tribute to the out-migration of health professionals (Bundred and Levitt, 2000; Pang
et al., 2002). This seems intuitively plausible but there is surprisingly little empirical
evidence. Much of the evidence we do have tends to be indirect. For example, work by
Miguel and Kremer (2004) has shown that negative economic shocks can cause civil
conflict and civil conflict in turn has been linked to health professional migration (see
Clemens, 2007). Taken together however, the empirical evidence seems to suggest a
potential role for economic shocks in explaining physician migration. But is there a
theoretical explanation for why economic shocks might affect doctor migration? In
this next section I lay out a simple model explaining how poor economic performance
in a given developing country might affect health professional migration.
2.2.1 Simple Model
There are several economic models which highlight some of the factors that play
into the individual decision to migrate (see e.g. Roy, 1951; Harris and Todaro, 1970).
Underlying all of these models though is a simple cost-benefit calculation: if the
expected discounted benefits from migration (higher earnings, better quality of life
etc) exceed the costs (transportation costs, job search costs, psychic costs etc) then an










Where B represents the benefits from migrating, C is the cost of migration and r
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is the discount rate.
If we assume that that the only benefit from migration is higher earnings, so that
B = Y Ft − Y Dt where Y Ft represents earnings in the foreign country and Y Dt represents









Let us assume that the physicians in country j are identical save for the fact
that they differ in C. In other words, there are individual-specific costs of migration.
One can also think of this as reflecting individual preferences for migration in terms
of equivalent income. I introduce the subscript i to denote the individual. Ci is
exogenous and distributed according to the pdfg(C). Each physician gets assigned a
unique Ci. This suggests that some physicians will have high costs of migration and
others will have low costs of migration.
For example, a physician born into a family with several members overseas will
have a lower Ci than another physician who is exactly the same except for the fact
that he is born into a family without a single member overseas, (in fact no one in his
family has ever been abroad). For the first physician, the cost of migrating is lower
for several reasons:
1. The direct costs are lower. For example adjustment costs and job search costs;
2. The psychic costs are also lower because he is more familiar with the foreign
environment (perhaps he spent a couple of summer abroad while he was in
medical school).
This implies that a threshold C exists, lets call it C∗, below which there is positive










Our simple stylized model would suggest that all doctors with Ci < C
∗ in country
j will migrate leaving behind only doctors with Ci ≥ C∗.
If the stock of doctors in country j at time t is given by St, then the fraction of
physicians in country j migrating in time t is given by StG(C
∗) where G(C∗) is the
CDF of C evaluated at C∗.
Given our formulation, a shock to earnings clearly alters C∗. A negative shock
to domestic earnings Y D will increase C∗, tipping more doctors over the edge. Some
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doctors with Ci ≥ C∗ previously, will now find that because C∗ has increased, they
now meet the migration condition Ci < C
∗.
The prediction from this admittedly stylized model is straightforward, if there is
a negative shock to domestic earnings, more physicians will migrate.
2.2.2 Economic shocks and earnings
Even though I do not model economic shocks directly, one plausible way in which
economic shocks can enter this model is through earnings, Y D. If domestic earnings
depend positively on economic conditions i.e. Y D = f(E); where ∂Y
∂E
> 0 and E rep-
resents aggregate economic conditions, then it follows that negative economic shocks
will reduce Y D and will increase the number of doctors migrating.
It is certainly plausible to think that earnings depend to some extent on economic
conditions. Dräger et al. (2006) for example show a positive correlation between
physician and nurse wages and GDP per capita. Realize also that in many African
countries, a large fraction of medical care is paid for out-of-pocket. On average,
private health expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa constitute about half of all health
expenditure and 80 percent of that are out-of-pocket costs.3 In bad economic times,
firms reduce output, workers are laid off and households reduce consumption.4 To
the extent that medical care consumption is a normal good, consumption of medical
care is reduced and this directly impacts a doctors earnings.5 In countries where
the government is the major employer of doctors, the link from aggregate economic
performance to earnings is less straightforward but it is not uncommon to have non-
payment of salaries because the government has run into fiscal difficulties (Zachariah
et al., 2001). In addition, it is fairly common to see doctors who work in the public
sector maintaining a private practice on the side (Ferrinho et al., 2004).
A less obvious but perhaps more important effect of negative economic shocks is
its indirect impact. It may change expectations about future earnings. If economic
shocks are not just purely transient but have longer term impacts so that a shock in
period t, has an effect not just in period t, but in t+ 1, t+ 2 and so on, then rational
expectations about the distribution of future earnings will change in response to a
shock today. And from our model a reduction in future domestic earnings clearly
affects migration. Here of course I are making the assumption that doctors are at
3Author’s calculations based on health expenditure data taken from the World Development
Indicators.
4Households are unable to borrow and smooth consumption because of imperfect credit markets.
Because these are aggregate shocks, informal sources of credit are also affected.
5We ignore the possibility that doctors can stimulate demand in order to augment their income.
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least partially forward looking. This appears to be consistent with the evidence (see
e.g. Nicholson and Souleles, 2002)
Interestingly many surveys of physicians cite despair about the future as an impor-
tant reason for migrating (see for example Awases et al., 2004). It appears therefore
that one can make a theoretical case for poor economic conditions affecting the mi-
gration of health professionals.
But is the empirical evidence consistent with the theory? I proceed to test this
hypothesis using a new dataset, which I introduce and describe, in the next section.
2.3 Data
One of the factors that has hindered research in this area has been a lack of
reliable data. Data on health professional migration from the countries of origin are
notoriously unreliable, which has meant that the vast majority of published work
has had to rely on destination country data. The problem with destination country
data is that it only captures migration to that country. To get a sense, let alone
an accurate measure, of the magnitude of health professional migration from a given
country one would have to collect data from many different destination countries.
For example until very recently there was no simple way to answer the question,
“what percentage of South Africa’s physicians have emigrated?”, a basic question
that would seem fundamental to the study of physician migration, but to answer that
one would have to get data from the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and a host of
other destination countries, by no means a simple task.
Fortunately two data sources now exist that attempt to quantify physician emi-
gration from all African countries: the Bhargava and Docquier dataset (Docquier and
Bhargava, 2007) hereinafter referred to as the BGD, and the Clemens and Pettersson
dataset (Clemens and Pettersson, 2008) hereinafter referred to as the CPD.
Both are ambitious and admirable attempts to quantify migration flows but both
have limitations. The BGD attempts to measure the stock of physicians from African
country j in 16 OECD countries in every year between 1991 and 2004 but is limited by
not having annual data for some of the countries (and thus relies on interpolation) and
is further limited because the definition of the African doctor is not consistent across
the entire sample.6 The CPD measures the stock of physicians from African country
j in nine different developed countries in the year 2000. It improves on the BGD by
6In their data, the African doctor is defined based on country of qualification (73% of the sample
in 2004), then where that data is not available, by country of birth (18% of the sample in 2004) and
where that is not available, by country of citizenship.
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defining the African doctor consistently across the entire sample (based on country
of birth), but suffers from one important limitation, it only gives us a snapshot of
emigration at one point in time and misses out on all the interesting dynamics of
emigration over time.
Neither data set is quite ideal for answering the question posed in this paper; the
CPD because of its cross-sectional nature and the BGD because it fails to capture em-
igration in the 1980s, a period of significant economic upheaval and turbulence. Also
both datasets capture stock, not flow. Due to these limitations, I use an alternative
data source which I describe in the next section.
2.3.1 Data Sources
The data set used in this paper captures migration from 31 sub-Saharan African
countries to two of the most important destination countries for emigrating African
doctors, the US and the UK (which together account for nearly two-thirds of the
stock of African physicians abroad). More importantly I capture migration over the
period 1975-2004.
US data comes from the US Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Gradu-
ates (ECFMG), which issues certificates to all foreign medical graduates. Note that
without ECFMG certification a foreign-trained physician cannot practice medicine
in the United States.7 I have data on the number of ECFMG certificates issued in
each year from 1975-2004 to physicians from 31 Sub-Saharan African countries. As
I argue later, year of ECFMG certification is a good proxy for migration to the US
especially for physicians from this region. UK data comes from the General Medical
Council (GMC), which plays a similar role as the ECFMG in the US. I have data on
the number of doctors from SSA granted registration for the first time in every year
between 1975 and 2004. For more details about the registration process for foreign
medical graduates in the UK, (see the excellent discussion in Constable et al., 2002).
In the next section I discuss my data and I compare it to earlier datasets. I
restrict my attention to the CPD because it is the more recent dataset and marginally
improves on the earlier effort by Bhargava and Docquier.
2.3.2 What our data is and what it is not
First of all, I follow the majority of the literature and define the African physician
based on country of medical training. In other words, a doctor trained in an African
7Certificates are only issued after the foreign medical graduate has passed all examinations and
his/her medical diploma has been verified (see detailed discussion in Boulet et al., 2006).
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country is an African physician. I prefer this definition to the country of birth defi-
nition for a couple of reasons. The country of birth measure counts a physician has
having migrated from country j if he/she was born in that country. This means that
a British child born in Kenya for example, who then returns to England and decides
to become a doctor is counted as having migrated from Kenya. Or take the case of an
Indian child born in Uganda who returned to India with his parents following the Idi
Amin purge of the 1970s, decided to go to medical school and who then later migrated
to the UK. The country of birth definition counts him/her as a Ugandan physician
who has migrated. As I show in Table A.2 in the appendix, this introduces system-
atic upward biases in migrant counts for certain SSA countries which have/had large
white (or non-native) populations or are popular travel destinations for foreigners;
countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.
Even if a physician is a true native, i.e. born in Africa to African parents, but
emigrated as a child with his parents, it is not obvious that he should be counted as
a migrant physician from his country of birth because it is not clear that he would
have chosen to train as a doctor if he had not migrated. It is also likely that from the
perspective of the country of origin, he would not be counted as a migrant physician.
I therefore think the more relevant measure is the number of physicians who trained
in those countries who then decide to migrate.
The country of training definition is not without it’s own problems however. For
example, by definition, countries without a medical school show up in the data as
having zero migration. In the data, 12 countries in SSA show up as having zero
migration because they did not have a medical school over most of the period covered
by our data (see appendix). These turn out however to be very small countries and
islands which have small populations and comparatively few physicians.8 Two other
concerns that may be raised about our data are: (1) I do not observe actual migration
and (2) I only capture one-way migrations flows. I proceed to tackle each in turn.
In the US data, what I observe is the number of ECFMG certificates issued (not
actual migration) and at least in theory it is possible to receive ECFMG certification
without being in the US. First I argue that year of certification is a close proxy for
actual migration especially in SSA because of the significant cost of getting certified
and I make the case that physicians who go to the trouble of getting ECFMG certified
have decided to migrate and are either in the US already or are on their way there.
To receive certification in the US, foreign-trained physicians must incur substantial
8Botswana, Eritrea, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea all now have medical schools established some
time after 2000.
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fixed costs. Currently, registration for the exams alone, which is a prerequisite for
certification, costs nearly 3000 US dollars. This represents a significant investment
for physicians in SSA countries where the average per capita income in 2005 was
$10009, and it makes sense to think that African doctors who incur that expense are
at most within a few years of emigrating. As will be seen later on when I introduce
the econometric strategy, I include several lags of economic shocks to account for this.
As an additional check I compare my US data with US data from the CPD which
comes from the 2000 US census, and show that the correlation between both is 0.98
(see Figure A.1 in the appendix).
The UK data counts the number of first-time registrations with the General Medi-
cal Council in a given year by physicians trained in SSA country j, implying that what
I observe is actual migration because registration can only be done if the physician is
in the UK. The problem is, and this brings us to the second concern, I only observe
one-way flows i.e. to traffic. It is entirely possible, even likely that some physicians
are only coming to the UK for post-graduate medical training. In other words, they
are not migrating permanently: they stay for a few years, finish their training and
then return to their countries of origin. This is arguably less of a problem in the
US where earlier work has shown that the rates of return migration are very low
(Mick and Worobey, 1984), but even for the UK, the percentage of foreign-trained
physicians that remain in the UK after completing their training is high at between
60-70 percent (Kangasniemi et al., 2007). We have no way of identifying those who
return and so to the extent that this is true, I may be slightly overstating the true
extent of migration. One reason why our South Africa numbers may differ from the
CPD data may be for precisely this reason (see Appendix). In addition to return
migration, another explanation for why the South African migration numbers to the
UK in my dataset might be that much higher than the comparable number in the
CPD is that South African physicians may simply use the UK as a staging point and
go on from there to other popular destinations such as Australia and New Zealand
(Padarath et al., 2003). The correlation between both datasets nevertheless is still
high at 0.77 (see Figure A.2 in the appendix). In the analysis which follows, I include
and then exclude South Africa from the sample as a sensitivity check and show that
my conclusions remain unchanged.
9In real dollars. By way of comparison, the world average in 2005 was $7200 USD and the average
for OECD countries was just over $26,000 (World Bank, 2008).
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2.3.3 The case for using only data on migration to the US and UK
Clearly there is emigration to other countries other than the US and the UK and
this is not captured in our data. As can be seen from Table 4.2, English-speaking SSA
countries generally have higher migration numbers to the US and the UK than French-
speaking countries. This makes sense because one would expect more migration
between countries that share a common language. In other words, one would expect
relatively more migration from Cote D’Ivoire (a French-speaking West African nation)
to either France or Belgium than to the US or the UK.
While this is undoubtedly true, for the vast majority of countries (the exceptions
are Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon and Guinea-Bissau), there
is non-zero migration to one or both of our destination countries. In addition, both
our destination countries account for a substantial amount of migratory flows. In
the year 2000, approximately 20 percent of all African doctors living abroad were in
the US alone; 43 percent were in the US and UK combined.10 When I restrict the
sample to the 48 Sub-Saharan countries, the percentages are even larger: 23 percent
in the US and 60 percent in the US and UK combined. In my dataset of 31 countries
the percentages are 24 percent and 62 percent respectively. In Figure A.3 in the
appendix, I plot the fraction of physicians from each SSA country in the US and the
UK combined using data from the CPD.
2.4 Descriptives
Migration statistics for the 31 countries in the sample are reported in Table 4.2.
Migration to the US is in Column 1, migration to the UK is in Column 2 and the total
is in Column 3. To enable comparison across countries, each country’s total migration
figure is scaled relative to it’s 2004 population (column 4). To put the numbers in
perspective I also report the number of doctors per 100,000 in each country (column
5). With the exception of Ethiopia (2003), Nigeria (2003), Tanzania (2002) and
Somalia (1997), the number of domestic doctors per 100,000 reported is for 2004.
While these numbers are at best a rough approximation, they give a sense of
the scale of the problem for each country. So for example only 94 Liberian doctors
migrated to the US and the UK between 1975 and 2004, which seems like a small
number, but expressed as a per capita ratio, it becomes 2.9 per 100,000. Compare
this to the number of physicians per 100,000 living in Liberia in 2004, 3. On the other
hand, 299 physicians migrated from Tanzania over the same period (which is more
10Authors calculations from Clemens (2006).
13
than triple the number of physicians who left Liberia) but this translates to 0.8 per
100,000, compared to a 2004 per capita ratio of 2.3.
As an aside, note that while our data is suitable for answering questions such
as the one posed in this paper, it is not the right kind of data to answer questions
such as ”what fraction of a country’s physicians are abroad?” The reason is simple:
I only capture migration to two destination countries, and secondly these numbers
can more accurately be described as capturing gross and not net migration. If the
intent is to simply to quantify the extent of migration from a given SSA country, then
one is better served using the kind of data collected by Clemens and Pettersson, and
Bhargava and Docquier. The numbers presented in Column 4 should therefore be
interpreted cautiously with those caveats in mind.
2.4.1 Data on economic conditions
Data on economic performance come from the World Development Indicators
(2007). One can think about measuring changes in economic conditions in different
ways. Rodrik (1994) for example measures economic shocks using shocks to terms
of trade; Ruhm (2000) uses unemployment rates as his measure of economic perfor-
mance. In this paper I proxy for economic conditions using changes in average per
capita incomes. A negative economic shock is defined as a decline in real GDP per
capita between year t − 1 and year t while a positive economic shock is an increase




Summary statistics for growth are presented in Table 3.4. In all, I have 864
country-year observations. Notice that there is a significant amount of within-country
as well as between-country variation in growth rates. The average for the entire
sample is 0.04 percent with a standard deviation of 7 percent. Thirteen countries have
negative average growth rates, with the Democratic Republic of Congo performing
the most poorly, while 18 countries experienced positive growth on average, led by
Mauritius with an average growth rate of 4.2 percent.
Next I ask the question, is there a correlation between economic growth and
physician migration over the period covered by the data as a whole? First I plot log
total emigration against growth (see Figure 4.3). Here each observation is a country.
The question I ask is does one observe more migration from countries that performed
worse on average?
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Figure 2.2: Is growth correlated with migration? (Cross-section)
As is evident from Figure 4.3, there does not appear to be a relationship. Next
I exploit the longitudinal nature of the data and pose a slightly different question;
does one observe an increase in physician migration when the economy does poorly
and a decrease in migration when the economy does better? In other words, is there
a counter-cyclical relationship between economic performance and physician emigra-
tion? I average over all the countries in the sample and plot log total migration
in each year on one axis and mean growth in the same year on the other axis (see
Figure 3.3).
There is not an obvious relationship but there does appear to be some counter-
cyclicality. Between the early-80s and the mid-90s when growth is mostly negative,
physician migration appears to increase and from the mid-90s to the mid-2000s when
growth is positive, physician migration appears to reduce. Even if we observed a clear
inverse relationship, this would still not imply causality for obvious reasons and so
we proceed to the econometric analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Is growth correlated with migration? (Time-series)
2.5 Econometric Model







The dependent variable is log migration for country j in year t. In other models I
specify the dependent variable as log migration per 100,000 population in year t. The
latter is a measure of physician density and accounts for differences in overall health
system size. Previous work by Arah (2007) has shown that migration statistics are
sensitive to how migration is measured. Growth enters in with several lags for two rea-
sons: (1) to account for the fact that migration is probably not instantaneous. From
the time the decision to migrate is made, it may take anywhere from a few months to
a few years before the physician is able to relocate. In our basic specification, S=2
but in sensitivity analyses I include more lags of growth. (2) I lag growth to account
for the fact that economic shocks in one period may have impacts that extend into
future periods. For example, an economic shock in period 1 may affect migration not
just in period 1 but also in period 2. If for example, a physician’s expectations about
economic growth (and therefore earnings) in period t + m are based at least in part
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on observed growth in period t and periods t − s, then one might expect a shock in
t− s to affect migration in t. One can therefore think of this lagged specification as
a crude reduced form model of expectations.
X is a vector of various time-varying and time invariant controls. Economic theory
predicts that the cost of migration will have a significant impact on migration. To
proxy for the cost of migration, I include a dummy variable for whether the country
is a former British colony. I hypothesize that physicians trained in those countries
are more likely to migrate to our two destination countries relative to physicians from
former French (and other) colonies. Because of the similarity in language, training and
curriculum between former British colonies and our destination countries, transition
costs should be lower for physicians trained in those countries.
I also include a distance variable which measures the distance in kilometers be-
tween country i and country j where i is either the United States or the United
Kingdom and j is one of the SSA countries in the sample. The distance measure
is taken from the CEPII bilateral distance dataset11 and measures the distances be-
tween the biggest cities of countries i and j, those inter-city distances being weighted
by the share of the city in the overall country’s population (Head and Mayer, 2002).
Again, I hypothesize that migration costs rise in relation to distance.
I also include a dummy variable for civil conflict to account for the fact that civil
conflict is probably correlated with both economic growth and migration. Fearon and
Laitin (2003) and Miguel and Kremer (2004), amongst others, have shown that civil
conflict negatively impacts economic growth and work by Clemens (2007) suggests
that civil conflict may lead to increased health professional migration. It is certainly
possible however that conflict/war may reduce migration if in times of civil conflict,
the cost of migration increases. For example, the pecuniary costs might increase if
travel arrangements become more difficult e.g. because a country closes it’s consulate
or scales down services. Alternatively, the psychological cost of migration might
increase if one is concerned about leaving family behind in a conflict situation.
It is also possible that civil conflict increases certain types of migration (e.g. to
neighboring countries as refugees) while reducing other types e.g. migration to OECD
countries, which require more planning and preparation. Hatton and Williamson
(2003) for example highlight the fact that only a tiny fraction of African refugees
displaced by conflict end up outside Africa; most of the displacement is to neighboring
countries.
Data on civil war/conflict comes from the well-known UCDP/PRIO Armed Con-
11Available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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flict Dataset (Version 4, 2008), developed by the International Peace Research In-
stitute of Oslo, Norway, and the University of Uppsala, Sweden (Gleditsch et al.,
2002). WAR is a dummy variable equal to 1 in years in which more than 1,000
battle-related deaths occurred in a given country. This definition is also taken from
the PRIO database and is commonly used in the conflict literature. I include it with
one lag.
The Roy model (Roy, 1951) predicts that macro-level factors such as political
stability will affect migration and so I include a dummy variable for coups and coup
attempts. This data comes from McGowan (2003) and covers the period from 1956 to
2001. Inclusion of this variable in the models reduces the sample size to 712. In the
models reported here COUP is a dummy variable equal to 1 in years in which at least
one coup attempt took place. The results are robust to specification of COUP as a
dummy for at least one successful coup attempt or as the number of coup attempts
in year t. I also include it one lag.
Other control variables include the domestic physician per capita ratio in 197512
because I hypothesize that physicians in countries with a higher physician per capita
ratio may be more likely to migrate if for example medical education is subsidized
so that too many physicians are produced i.e. there is excess supply, or conversely
may be less likely to migrate if a higher per capita ratio is acting as a proxy for
unobserved demand for medical care (and by extension for medical care inputs).
GDP75 is real GDP per capita in 1975 included to account for the fact that ceteris
paribus, physicians from richer countries may be less likely to emigrate. To allow
for non-linearities in the effect of GDP per capita, I divide real GDP in 1975 into
quartiles and enter GDP75 as a categorical variable. The results are qualitatively
similar to specifying GDP75 as a flexible polynomial. Data comes from the Penn
World Tables (version 6.2). Results for the basic OLS specification are in Table 2.4
(Column 1).
Note that the choice of control variables is also constrained by the data avail-
able. For example I would have liked to control for government per capita health
expenditure as a way to proxy for investments in health capital but I only have that
data for a small subset of countries and for a small subset of years. Other variables
that potentially belong in this model are the wage differential between origin and
destination country as well as the inequality differential, but even if these data were
available, their effect could not be separately identified from those of the year fixed
12Or the earliest year available for the following countries: Congo (1978), Benin and Mozambique
(1980), Guinea and Malawi (1981), Angola (1984) and Cote D’Ivoire (1985).
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effects which we include in most specifications.
Next I estimate fixed effects models where I include country fixed effects to control
for time-invariant country-specific factors, and year fixed effects to account for overall
trends in migration. Note that changes in US/UK immigration policy over time,
changes in US/UK demand for foreign medical graduates etc, should affect all the
countries in our sample similarly (relative to if I had a more heterogeneous sample
for example) and should therefore be captured by the time fixed effects. In some
specifications I allow for country-specific time trends. The basic model I estimate has
the following form:








jtγ + υj + εjt
The dependent variable is again log migration in year t; δt captures common time
trends, X is a vector of controls and υj are the country fixed effects. I overwhelmingly
reject the null of common time trends (F-statistic = 14254) and so in the preferred
specification I allow for country-specific time trends. I again control for contempo-
raneous and lagged conflict, a quadratic of population as well as contemporaneous
and lagged coup attempts; but the other variables, which do not vary over time, drop
out of the equation. By estimating fixed-effects models, the parameter of interest is
identified off of within-country variation in economic conditions over time. Summary
statistics are in Table 4.3. I estimate all models first for total migration (Table 2.4
columns 2-4) and then separately for US and UK migration (Table 2.5 and Table 2.6).
Results for the alternative specification where the dependent variable is log migration
per 100,000 population are shown in Table 2.7.
From Table 2.4 column 1, we see that the coefficient on BRITISH has the ex-
pected sign and is statistically significant suggesting that physicians from former
British colonies are indeed much more likely to migrate to our two destination coun-
tries relative to physicians from former French and Portuguese colonies for example.
The coefficient implies that relative to countries not colonized by the British, ex-
British colonies have more than double the amount of physician migration (144%).
The coefficient on DOCTORS75 suggests that physician migration is higher from
countries with higher physician per capita ratios. An increase of 1 per 100,000 in the
domestic physician per capita ratio in 1975 is associated with a 7.2 percent increase
in physician migration. The signs on WAR suggest a positive effect of contempora-
neous civil conflict (with >1000 battle-related deaths) on physician migration and a
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negative effect of lagged war, but none of the coefficients approach significance. The
coefficient on distance is negative as hypothesized but also not statistically significant.
The pattern of coefficients on GDP per capita even though not significant suggest
that the effect of country wealth is non-linear.13 Going from the bottom quartile of
GDP per capita to the next quartile increases physician migration by about 3 percent
but subsequently the effect of increasing wealth is negative. This seems to align with
previous work (Hatton and Williamson, 2005; Lucas, 2005) which has suggested that
there might be an inverse U-shaped relationship between migration and per capita
income, with less migration occurring at low levels of income per capita (because
of binding liquidity constraints) and at high levels of income per capita (because of
smaller gains from migration).
Neither growth nor lagged growth is significantly associated with physician mi-
gration in the OLS specification. In the fixed effects specifications however (columns
2-4), contemporaneous growth becomes statistically significant and the coefficients on
lagged growth reverse sign and become negative. The estimates are robust to inclu-
sion of year fixed effects (column 3) and country-specific time trends (column 4). The
results suggest that, consistent with the model, economic shocks have a significant
impact on physician migration. A one percentage point decrease in contemporane-
ous growth increases physician migration by between 0.4 and 0.6 percent and a one
percentage point decrease in last year’s growth increases physician migration this
year by approximately 0.3 percent. This is a relatively small effect. It implies that a
negative growth shock equivalent to 1 SD in this data will result in the migration of
approximately one extra physician on average.
Relative to the fixed effects estimates, the OLS estimates, which one would ob-
tain from a cross-country regression, not only understate the impact of migration
by about a factor of ten, they, in the case of lagged growth, also have the wrong
sign. These basic pattern of results continues to hold when we look at US migration
separately from UK migration (Table 2.5 and Table 2.6). Negative economic shocks
lead to increased physician migration. Economic shocks appears to impact migration
to the US and the UK similarly. For the other coefficients though I find heteroge-
neous impacts: lagged war for example significantly decreases migration to the US
at the same time as it increases migration to the UK. Not surprisingly, the effect of
BRITISH is about 1.5 times larger in the UK regression. In other words, being an
ex-British colony has a larger effect on migration to the UK than it has on migration
13The lack of significance is perhaps not surprising given that there isn’t a tremendous amount of
variation in GDP per capita in this sample.
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to the US. Notice also that in the UK regression (Table 2.6 column 1), distance is
now statistically significant. The point estimate implies that if we have two countries
A and B that are similar in every respect except that B is further away from the UK
than A by 1000 kilometers, then B will have 16 percent less physician to the UK than
A.
Even though coups (which acts as a proxy for political instability) on average do
not seem to have a statistically significant effect on migration in any of the models,
it turns out that is because they have heterogenous effects. Lagged coup attempts
(which imply less political stability) do infact increase physician migration as hypoth-
esized, but only in richer countries. I estimate the models in Table 2.4 separately for
each GDP quartile and find that for countries in the top two income quartiles, coups
in the previous period (successful or not) increase physician migration in the present
period by between 14 and 18 percent (p<0.05).14
In Table 2.7 I present an alternative specification. The dependent variable here is
log migration per 100,000 domestic population. The difference between this and the
previous specification is that migration here is scaled by each country’s population.
Total migration is in column 1, migration to the US is in column 2 and migration
to the UK is in column 3 and all models include country-specific time trends which
are the preferred specification. Overall, we see that the results continue to hold. A
one percentage point decline in last year’s growth increases physician migration per
100,000 by 0.05 percent. Or to put it differently, a negative growth shock equivalent
to 1 SD will result in an extra 0.13 physicians per 100,000 population migrating.
For illustrative purposes, in Figure 4.4, I graph the impulse response function
for the median country in the sample, Malawi. The underlying model is a vector
autoregression model with two lags. It plots out the full adjustment path for migration
following a permanent one percentage point shock to growth in time t. We see that a
negative (positive) shock to growth in year 0 increases (decreases) migration in years
1 through 3. The peak is in year 1 with an increase (decrease) in physician migration
of about 3 percent. By year 4 however, migration returns to pre-shock levels. We have
a short time-series with only 25 observations and so the confidence interval includes
zero but this graph serves to illustrate the point.
Even though I control for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics by
including country fixed effects and allow for country-specific time effects, it is still
possible that potentially important variables which belong in this model have been
omitted. If these variables are correlated with both growth and physician migration,
14Those results are available from the author on request.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Function
then the estimates reported are biased. One can think of variables which might belong
in this model which are not included. For example, income inequality which theory
predicts will impact migration and which is also correlated with economic growth.
Immigration policy is another example. Clearly destination country immigration pol-
icy will affect the flow of migrants and it may very well be correlated with economic
growth in the source country. For example, UK immigration policy is more accom-
modating towards physicians from EU countries relative to physicians from non-EU
countries and EU countries on average experience better economic performance. To
the extent that these omitted variables are time-invariant or at least change very
slowly (and over the long run), then they are captured by the country fixed effects.
If they vary over time in a way that is not markedly different across the countries
of origin in the sample, then they are subsumed to a large extent by the time fixed
effects.
Another reason why the error term might still be correlated with growth is mea-
surement error. Previous work has raised the issue of measurement error in national
accounts data (Heston, 1994). If GDP per capita is measured with error, then growth
is also measured with error, which will tend to bias our coefficients towards zero if the
measurement error is classical. This may explain the small coefficients I find. There
are several ways one could account for both these concerns. One approach would
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be to use instrumental variables. If for example, I had another variable that was
correlated with growth but not with the error term, in other words an instrument,
then I could get an unbiased estimate of the effect of economic growth on physician
migration.
2.6 Instrumental variables
I instrument for growth with rainfall and terms of trade. Rainfall is plausibly
exogenous and has become quite a popular instrument in the development literature
(Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Paxson, 1992; Ciccone and Brückner, 2008). It is partic-
ularly appropriate in this sample because agriculture is a major component of GDP
for many African countries, but at the same time, irrigation farming is only a small
proportion of agriculture in Africa (most agricultural land is rain-fed). Rainfall data
comes from the NASA Global Precipitation and Climatology Project (GPCP). This
measures monthly rainfall in millimeters and is a combination of rainfall gauge data
and satellite data. The rainfall series starts in 1979.
Following methodology described in Miguel and Kremer (2004) I calculate to-
tal yearly rainfall for each 2.5-latitude/longitude degree node within a country and
then aggregate data over all the country nodes to get yearly rainfall estimates for
each country. The rainfall instruments are rainfall growth in year t, i.e. percent-
age increase in rainfall in mm between t − 1 and t; rainfall growth lagged one year
and rainfall growth lagged two years. Other specification of rainfall including rain-
fall levels, rainfall levels with various lags, flexible polynomials of rainfall and mean
deviations of rainfall resulted in a weaker first stage.
A country’s terms of trade are the ratio of its export price index to its import
price index. Terms of trade are plausibly exogenous because they depend on move-
ments in commodity prices, which are in turn determined by world aggregate demand
and supply conditions. The exogeneity argument of course relies on the assumption
that an individual countrys decisions are unlikely to significantly affect world market
prices. Note that this assumption may be less true for large countries like the US and
China, which can single-handedly affect commodity prices, but it is likely to hold for
the countries in our sample.
Terms of trade data come from two sources: the primary source is the World
Development Indicators and for most countries data is available from 1980.15 and
the other dataset which I use to fill in missing observations, mostly from 1975-1980,
15The terms of trade variable in the WDI is called net barter terms of trade (base year = 2000).
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is the New York University Development Research Institute (DRI) macro time series
dataset.16 I instrument for growth using the percentage change in net barter terms
of trade. First stage regressions are reported in Table 2.8 and the IV results are
contained in Table 2.9. Because growth (t−2) is small and insignificant across all the
models and does not markedly improve model fit, I opt for the more parsimonious
specification including only one lag of growth.
The results in Table 2.8 show a strong relationship between current and lagged
rainfall growth and economic growth. The point estimate implies that a 5 percentage
point increase in rainfall growth increases economic growth by approximately 0.25
percentage points. These results are robust to inclusion of various fixed effects. In
all models, I cluster standard errors at the country level to account for within group
correlation. Because the model is over-identified (I have two endogenous variables
and four instruments), I can test the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. I
report various test statistics including the Anderson-Rubin F-statistic (Anderson and
Rubin, 1949) and the Sargan-Hansen statistic. The Anderson-Rubin test statistic has
a chi-square distribution with N degrees of freedom where N is equal to the number of
instruments and is weak instrument robust. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients
on the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero in the reduced form equation
with the full set of instruments included as instruments. In all specifications I fail to
reject the null. The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. It
also has a chi-square distribution and tests the null hypothesis that the instruments
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Again in every specification, I
fail to reject the null, which suggests that the instruments are valid.
I test for the strength of the excluded instruments and report the F-statistic
for the Kleibergen-Papp Wald test, preferred here to the Cragg-Donald F-statistic,
because it remains valid in the presence of non-i.i.d errors (Kleibergen and Paap,
2006). The Cragg-Donald F-statistic relies on the i.i.d assumption and is problematic
in this case because I cluster the standard errors. One concern here is the strength
of the instruments: it is now fairly well known that 2SLS estimates are biased in
finite samples and that this bias can be quite large when the correlation between
the endogenous variable and the instruments is weak (Nelson and Starz, 1990; Bound
et al., 1995) . It has also been shown that the sampling distribution of 2SLS estimates
is non-normal and that the standard hypothesis tests are unreliable in the presence




Stock and Yogo (2005) in their seminal work, derive critical values for assessing
whether instruments are weak, and rejection of the null relative to the critical value
implies that the bias in the coefficient estimates is probably small and that the usual
tests of inference are valid. In the case of multiple endogenous variables, the critical
values are based on the Cragg-Donald F-statistic, which as earlier mentioned, relies
on the assumption of homoskedastic errors. It is unclear the extent to which those
critical values generalize to the case of serial correlation and/or heteroskedasticity
in the error term, but to address concerns about the strength of the instruments,
I re-estimate the model using the Fuller LIML estimator, which is more robust to
weak instruments (Hahn and Hausman, 2003; Stock et al., 2002). The Fuller k-
estimator sets k = kLIML − bT−K where K is the number of instruments (Fuller, 1977)
. Following most of the literature I set the Fuller parameter b equal to 1
Results using the Fuller estimator are reported in Table 2.9 (column 4). The
coefficient estimates are virtually identical to those in column 3 and our conclusions
remain unchanged. I estimate each model separately for US and UK migration and
our pattern of results continue to hold, which is reassuring. Results are in Table 2.10
and Table 2.11.
Overall I find that IV estimates are several orders of magnitude larger than the
OLS estimates suggesting that our OLS estimates were biased towards zero. The
signs are in the expected direction and the coefficient on lagged growth is statistically
significant. The point estimate implies that a one percentage point decrease in lagged
growth increases physician migration by between 3.4–3.6 percent. The coefficients on
lagged growth again have similar magnitudes for US and UK migration. I find no
effect of contemporaneous growth shocks.
2.6.1 Robustness Checks
It is possible that South Africa, which by far has the largest number of migrating
physicians, is driving the results of this analysis and so I omit South Africa from
the sample (results not shown). The results are essentially unchanged. I also drop
countries one by one and the results are similar. I go on to test whether the results
are robust to excluding all country-year cells with zero out-migration (those results
are available on request) and find that the qualitative conclusions remain the same.
Next, because the war variable might be collinear with the coup variable, I include
only WAR or only COUP in other specifications and the results hold.
In other analysis, I explore whether the impact of growth is non-linear. It is pos-
sible for example that negative economic shocks have different impacts from positive
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shocks. In columns 1-2 Table 2.12, I have restricted the sample to include only ob-
servations where growth is negative and in columns 3-4 I have restricted the sample
to include only observations where growth is positive. Both models include country-
specific time trends. I find that the coefficients are roughly similar in magnitude
even though the 2SLS estimates are not significant, probably as a result of the small
sample size.
I also examine whether the effect of growth depends on the level of income. One
way to do this would be to interact growth with GDP per capita levels, but I choose
instead to estimate the model separately for each quartile of income. This is a more
flexible specification because it allows the effect of each explanatory variable to also
depend on income. This amounts to a fully interacted model where all the variables
are interacted with income levels.17 In Table 2.13 Columns 1–4, I present the fixed
effects specification and find a positive coefficient on lagged growth for the lowest
income quartile which suggests that for the lowest income countries, growth may
infact increase migration. It is statistically indistinguishable from zero however. In
Column 5 I present the 2SLS equivalent of Column 1 i.e. the coefficients from the
2SLS regression for the lowest income countries and show that the sign becomes
negative and similar in magnitude to the coefficients in Table 2.9.
2.7 Conclusion
This is one of the first papers to systematically examine one of the push factors of-
ten mentioned as contributing to health professional migration. I estimate distributed
lag fixed effects regressions controlling for time-invariant country characteristics and
time trends, and I also estimate instrumental variable regressions to account for un-
observed heterogeneity and measurement error. Overall I find a statistically and
substantively significant effect of economic shocks on physician migration. Accord-
ing to the IV estimates, a one percentage point decline in lagged economic growth
causes an increase in physician migration by between 3.4–3.6 percent and these results
are robust to a variety of specifications and robustness checks. This paper presents
fairly compelling evidence that short-term economic shocks have indeed contributed
to the documented acceleration in physician migration to developed countries from
sub-Saharan Africa.
17As discussed earlier, I found that the effect of some of the explanatory variables also varied by
country wealth.
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Table 2.1: Physician migration from 31 countries
country US UK Total Per capita 2004 Stock1
Angola 2 1 3 .019 8
Benin 6 0 6 .073 4.5
Burundi 8 1 9 .12 2.8
Cameroon 159 29 188 1.2 19
Congo 3 0 3 .077 20
Cote D’Ivoire 0 3 3 .017 12
DRC 37 8 45 .081 11
Ethiopia 594 52 646 .92 2.7
Ghana 927 553 1480 6.8 15
Guinea 7 0 7 .079 11
Kenya 512 178 690 2.1 14
Liberia 67 27 94 2.9 3
Madagascar 17 0 17 .094 29
Malawi 13 33 46 .36 2.2
Mali 1 0 1 .0076 7.9
Mauritius 58 0 58 4.7 106
Mozambique 5 3 8 .041 2.7
Niger 3 0 3 .022 3
Nigeria 3509 3533 7042 5.1 28
Rwanda 6 0 6 .068 4.7
Senegal 9 2 11 .097 5.7
Seychelles 4 0 4 4.8 151
Sierra Leone 71 13 84 1.6 3.3
Somalia 53 8 61 .77 4
South Africa 2936 15356 18292 39 77
Sudan 0 1111 1111 3.1 22
Tanzania 213 86 299 .8 2.3
Togo 4 0 4 .067 4.5
Uganda 237 148 385 1.4 8.3
Zambia 118 203 321 2.8 12
Zimbabwe 231 369 600 4.6 16
1 Number of domestic physicians per 100,000 population
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Table 2.2: Economic Growth (1975-2004)
country mean sd N fracneg*
Angola .01 7.7 24 .29
Benin .32 3.3 30 .37
Burundi -.4 4.6 30 .6
Cameroon 1.1 6.6 30 .33
Congo .55 6.7 30 .5
Cote D’Ivoire -1.5 4.6 30 .67
DRC -4.3 4.9 30 .83
Ethiopia .21 7.9 23 .52
Ghana -.011 4.6 30 .23
Guinea .67 1.5 25 .36
Kenya .27 2.3 30 .47
Liberia -3.5 24 30 .67
Madagascar -1.5 4.6 30 .63
Malawi .3 5.4 30 .37
Mali 1.1 5.7 30 .4
Mauritius 4.2 1.7 24 0
Mozambique 1.9 7.5 24 .38
Niger -1.3 5.5 30 .63
Nigeria -.25 5.3 30 .53
Rwanda 1.4 12 30 .43
Senegal .39 4.2 30 .37
Seychelles 2.6 6.8 30 .43
Sierra Leone -.7 7.9 30 .47
Somalia .75 8.7 16 .5
South Africa -.0071 2.3 30 .43
Sudan 1.9 5.8 30 .3
Tanzania 1.3 2.3 16 .25
Togo -.61 6.4 30 .5
Uganda 1.9 3.2 22 .14
Zambia -1.5 4 30 .6
Zimbabwe -1.2 5.7 30 .63
Total .042 7.3 864 .45
* Fraction of years with negative growth
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
variable mean sd min max
Growth (t) -.143 7.46 -50.5 89.8
Growth (t-1) -.18 7.53 -50.5 89.8
Growth (t-2) -.215 7.6 -50.5 89.8
War (t) .125 .331 0 1
War (t-1) .125 .331 0 1
Pop/100,000 155 193 .617 1280
Coup (t) .0787 .269 0 1
Coup (t-1) .0801 .272 0 1
British .41 .492 0 1
Doctor stock in 1975 8.84 10.3 1.16 53.9
Real GDP in 1975 1805 1464 489 6874
GDP 1st quartile 787 189 489 1042
GDP 2nd quartile 1181 68.9 1085 1291
GDP 3rd quartile 1520 205 1370 1991
GDP 4th quartile 4013 1732 2093 6874
Distance (US)/1000 11.9 2.35 7.83 16.5
Distance (UK)/1000 6.47 1.63 4.32 9.89
Rainfall in mm (t) 1072 489 132 2588
Rainfall (t-1) 1078 491 132 2588
Rainfall growth (t) .874 18.9 -55 89
Rainfall growth (t-1) .893 19 -55 89
Rainfall growth (t-2) 1.08 18.9 -55 89
Change in Terms of trade .335 17.8 -56.8 102
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Table 2.4: Fixed Effects Models - Total Migration (Dependent variable is log migra-
tion)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE FE
Growth (t) -.00067 -.0043** -.0045* -.0057***
(.0031) (.0019) (.0025) (.0015)
Growth (t-1) .00029 -.0025* -.0024 -.0032**
(.002) (.0013) (.0017) (.0016)
Growth (t-2) .00082 -.00057 .00057 -.00065
(.0041) (.0029) (.0026) (.0033)
War (t) .073 .058 .052 -.039
(.12) (.12) (.13) (.092)
War (t-1) -.011 -.06 -.031 -.16
(.13) (.14) (.14) (.11)
Coup (t) -.0067 -.14 -.16 -.057
(.13) (.12) (.11) (.062)
Coup (t-1) .083 -.068 -.078 .0081
(.12) (.1) (.089) (.047)




Doctors per 100,000 pop in 1975 .072***
(.0099)
Real GDP in 1975* (2nd quartile) .28
(.26)
Real GDP in 1975 (3rd quartile) -.17
(.35)
Real GDP in 1975 (4th quartile) -.088
(.32)
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Country-Specific time trend No No No Yes
N 712 712 712 712
R2 0.83 0.22 0.29 0.43
AIC 1579 908 881 685
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
* Comparison group is countries in the bottom quartile of income
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Table 2.5: Fixed Effects Models - Migration to the US (Dependent variable is log
migration)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE FE
Growth (t) -.0033 -.0039* -.0042** -.0042**
(.0031) (.002) (.002) (.0018)
Growth (t-1) -.0019 -.0018 -.0016 -.0018
(.0029) (.0014) (.0017) (.0011)
Growth (t-2) -.0041 -.0019 -.00011 -.0013
(.0051) (.004) (.0032) (.0048)
War (t) -.25 -.0094 .0077 -.14
(.23) (.12) (.12) (.11)
War (t-1) -.24 -.15* -.076 -.25***
(.16) (.08) (.076) (.083)
Coup (t) .057 .006 -.0085 .02
(.12) (.07) (.064) (.058)
Coup (t-1) .017 -.023 -.047 -.0068
(.13) (.096) (.089) (.063)




Doctors per 100,000 pop in 1975 .054***
(.0083)
Real GDP in 1975* (2nd quartile) .0019
(.36)
Real GDP in 1975 (3rd quartile) -.17
(.29)
Real GDP in 1975 (4th quartile) -.15
(.28)
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Country-Specific time trend No No No Yes
N 712 712 712 712
R2 0.68 0.060 0.18 0.30
AIC 1707 968 910 756
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
* Comparison group is countries in the bottom quartile of income
31
Table 2.6: Fixed Effects Models - Migration to the UK (Dependent variable is log
migration)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE FE FE
Growth (t) -.002 -.0037 -.002 -.0048*
(.0038) (.0031) (.0034) (.0025)
Growth (t-1) -.0012 -.0021 -.0011 -.0029**
(.0019) (.0015) (.0016) (.0014)
Growth (t-2) .0036 .0027 .0039 .00042
(.0024) (.0022) (.0024) (.0019)
War (t) .26 .13 .11 .17
(.16) (.16) (.15) (.12)
War (t-1) -.0071 -.042 -.091 .033
(.2) (.18) (.18) (.14)
Coup (t) -.14 -.22 -.22 -.063
(.16) (.14) (.13) (.089)
Coup (t-1) -.035 -.11 -.087 .025
(.11) (.071) (.075) (.047)




Doctors per 100,000 pop in 1975 .081***
(.011)
Real GDP in 1975* (2nd quartile) .28
(.25)
Real GDP in 1975 (3rd quartile) -.36
(.29)
Real GDP in 1975 (4th quartile) -.089
(.27)
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Country-Specific time trend No No No Yes
N 712 712 712 712
R2 0.80 0.37 0.43 0.64
AIC 1524 936 909 542
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
* Comparison group is countries in the bottom quartile of income
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Growth (t) -.00053 -.00023 -.00037
(.00039) (.00025) (.0003)
Growth (t-1) -.0005** -.00027** -.00029*
(.00022) (.00011) (.00017)
Growth (t-2) -.00055 -.00054 -5.1e-05
(.00039) (.0004) (7.1e-05)
War (t) -.0025 -.012 .0079
(.0071) (.0094) (.0071)
War (t-1) -.051 -.026 -.036
(.041) (.017) (.037)
Coup (t) .0035 .0065 -.003
(.006) (.0057) (.0039)
Coup (t-1) .0042 .0024 .0012
(.0062) (.0052) (.004)
N 712 712 712
R2 0.21 0.29 0.36
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
All models include controls for country-specific time trends
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Table 2.8: First-Stage Results for Growth
(1) (2) (3)
FE FE FE
Rainfall Growth (t) 0.052*** 0.044** 0.052***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Rainfall Growth (t-1) 0.060*** 0.054** 0.059***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.017)
Rainfall Growth (t-2) 0.046*** 0.022 0.046***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.015)
Percent change in terms of trade 0.014 0.017 0.015
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
N 544 544 544
Partial R2 0.036 0.024 0.036
F 6.64 3.21 5.69
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
F-statistic on excluded instruments
Table 2.9: 2SLS Models - Total Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Fuller LIML
Growth (t) .0033 .029 -.0017 -.0022
(.018) (.023) (.017) (.016)
Growth (t-1) -.023 -.011 -.036** -.034**
(.014) (.018) (.016) (.014)
N 544 544 544 544
Kleibergen-Papp F-stat 4.95 3.49 5.33 5.33
Hansen J-stat 0.035 0.32 0.011 0.011
Hansen chi2 P-value 0.98 0.85 0.99 0.99
Anderson-Rubin F-stat 0.95 0.71 2.01
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
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Table 2.10: 2SLS Estimates - Migration to the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Fuller LIML
Growth (t) -.023 .012 -.016 -.016
(.026) (.022) (.027) (.026)
Growth (t-1) -.026** -.026 -.027** -.026**
(.012) (.017) (.013) (.012)
N 544 544 544 544
Kleibergen-Papp F-stat 4.95 3.49 5.33 5.33
Hansen J-stat 1.11 0.45 0.76 0.78
Hansen chi2 P-value 0.57 0.80 0.68 0.68
Anderson-Rubin F-stat 2.06 1.14 2.01
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
Table 2.11: 2SLS Estimates - Migration to the UK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Fuller LIML
Growth (t) .033* .033 .016 .017
(.017) (.022) (.017) (.017)
Growth (t-1) -.0099 .0028 -.026* -.027*
(.015) (.013) (.013) (.014)
N 544 544 544 544
Kleibergen-Papp F-stat 4.95 3.49 5.33 5.33
Hansen J-stat 2.26 3.42 1.44 1.37
Hansen chi2 P-value 0.32 0.18 0.49 0.50
Anderson-Rubin F-stat 2.17 1.98 2.35
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
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Table 2.12: Non-linearities in impact of growth shocks
Growth<0 Growth>0
FE 2SLS FE 2SLS
Growth (t) -.013*** .03 -.0041 -.073
(.0032) (.033) (.0036) (.12)
Growth (t-1) -.0054* -.036 -.0031 -.046
(.003) (.024) (.003) (.045)
N 354 260 389 284
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions include controls for country-specific time trends
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
Table 2.13: Does the effect of growth depend on country wealth?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE FE 2SLS
Growth (t) -.0042 -.012* -.0059** -.0062 -.00081
(.0034) (.0055) (.0022) (.0047) (.038)
Growth (t-1) .0014 -.012 -.0026 -.0046 -.045
(.0027) (.011) (.0024) (.0064) (.035)
N 179 202 197 165 157
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All regressions include controls for country-specific time trends
All standard errors are clustered at the country level
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CHAPTER III
Doctors Across Borders: Do Higher Salaries Lead
to Less Physician Migration?
3.1 Introduction
It is by now common knowledge that physician migration from sub-Saharan Africa
has increased significantly over the last two decades. Quantitative estimates vary, but
overall, the same pattern emerges across different studies (see for example Dovlo and
Nyonator, 1999; Hagopian et al., 2004; Okeke, 2008). This trend of increasing migra-
tion has sparked a debate about the potential consequences of physician migration
for the countries of origin. Hagopian et al. (2005) for example argue that unimpeded
migration of a country’s physicians may impair delivery of health services; Awases
et al. (2004) posit that it may reduce the quality of care provided in these countries
(perhaps because more care will be provided by less skilled professionals). A slightly
different argument is that countries of origin suffer financial losses when domestically
trained physicians emigrate. The training of physicians in Africa for the most part
is publicly financed and it is estimated that the cost of training a medical student is
somewhere in the neighborhood of $10,000 per student per year, in a region where
the average per capita income was approximately $1000 in 2005 (World Bank, 2008).
Dovlo and Nyonator (1999) for example estimate that between 1986 and 1995, Ghana
lost an estimated US$6 million in tuition costs from the 61 percent of medical gradu-
ates from one of its medical schools that emigrated. Kirigia et al. (2006) calculate the
cost of educating a doctor from primary school to university in Kenya and conclude
that for each doctor who emigrates, the country loses approximately US$ 517,931 in
returns from that investment.
Even though the debate about the consequences of physician migration is still on-
going, there is general agreement among policy makers that the scale and the extent
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of migration are worrying. Doctor-to-population ratios in many developing countries
are already critically low and there is concern that migration of health professionals
can only exacerbate these problems. In its 2006 Report, the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) identifies some of the challenges to meeting the Millennium Development
Goals and highlights the critical role of health professionals (WHO, 2006). In a bid to
at least slow the migration of doctors and other health professionals from developing
countries, various strategies have been called for. These strategies range from those
which sensibly attempt to address what are thought to be the underlying causes of
migration (such as low wages) to those which seek to place barriers in the way of
health professionals who want to migrate.
One can think of these strategies as falling into one of two groups: those that
accept migration as inevitable and therefore propose alternatives such as training of
other cadres of health workers and mid-level providers (see for example Vaz et al.,
1999; Dovlo, 2004); and those that seek to reduce/prevent migration through use of
financial and non-financial incentives. See a discussion of some of these incentives
in Bärnighausen and Bloom (2009). See also Hagopian et al. (2005). Most of the
initiatives, I would argue, fall into the latter category. Despite their potential im-
portance, little is known about the extent to which many of these incentive schemes
work. There are few rigorous evaluations in the literature and much of the evidence
that is available is anecdotal. In this paper, I make an initial contribution to filling
what is a rather large gap in the literature by studying the impact of one commonly
proposed mechanism: increasing doctors’ salaries.
3.2 Previous Literature
There are numerous papers which discuss the factors that contribute to the mi-
gration of physicians and other health professionals (Bärnighausen and Bloom, 2009,
provide a good overview). A survey of this literature soon reveals the fact that many
researchers are in agreement that low wages play an important role in the migration
of physicians. Dovlo and Martineau (2004) go as far as to call remuneration the most
important factor for retaining health workers. Clearly, there is still disagreement
about the importance of wages relative to other factors,1 but it appears there is fairly
broad consensus that increasing salaries are an important mechanism for slowing the
migration of health professionals (see for example Pang et al., 2002; Mensah et al.,
2005). Awases et al. (2004) provide some empirical evidence in keeping with this
1Rightly so as this is still an open question.
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point of view. In a survey of health workers in six countries conducted in 2002,2
between 68 percent (Cameroon) and 90 percent (Senegal) of health workers said they
would not migrate if they were better paid. In another survey of health profession-
als conducted in five different countries (Colombia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the
Phillipines) by Astor et al. (2005), 91 percent of respondents rated a desire for higher
income as a highly significant motivating factor for migrating abroad and more than
80 percent agreed that increasing physicians’ salaries would be an effective way of
reducing physician migration.
As it turns out, there aren’t very many studies which directly examine the relation-
ship between doctors’ salaries and migration – Vujicic et al. (2004) is one exception –
but there are papers which examine the impact of wage differentials more broadly, and
one can certainly draw inference from these studies. Hatton and Williamson (2003)
for example estimate the effect of wages on net migration using a panel dataset of
twenty-one African countries covering the years 1977 to 1995. In their IV models,
they find that a 10 percent increase in the foreign to domestic wage ratio for un-
skilled labor increases out-migration by nearly one per thousand of the population.
Clark et al. (2002) find qualitatively similar results using a different panel dataset
on migration to the US from 81 countries between 1971 and 1998. They find that a
10 percent decrease in a country’s income per capita (relative to the US) increased
migration to the US by about 6 percent. Ortega and Peri (2009) examine migration
flows from 74 countries of origin into 14 OECD countries between 1980 and 2005
and find that income per capita differences have a positive and significant effect on
bilateral migration flows. Increasing the income differential by $1,000 PPP increased
migration flows by approximately 10 percent.3
When evaluated as a whole, the empirical evidence appears to be consistent with
the various theoretical models which predict that wage differentials will have an im-
pact on migration (see Borjas, 1987). This suggests that increasing doctors salaries
should decrease the rate of migration. There are several reasons however why increas-
ing salaries may not have an effect on the observed migration rate: (1) The existence
of credit constraints in developing countries is fairly well established (see for example
Diagne et al., 2000; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006; De Mel et al., 2008; Banerjee and
Duflo, 2008), and this might act as a binding constraint limiting physician migra-
2The six countries were Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. In
total, 2382 health professionals were interviewed, approximately 336 of whom were doctors.
3It is possible to frame physician migration as a locational choice problem. If one does, then
there is an extensive literature on physician location choice within developed countries that becomes
relevant. Ernst and Yett (1985) was an early influential piece of work in this area.
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tion. There are large fixed costs associated with international migration, especially
for physicians, who in addition to moving costs, need to also pay for licensing exam-
inations which are often required to practice in a foreign country. The US medical
licensing examinations for example, costs nearly 3000 US dollars (which amounts to
nearly one year of wages for physicians in some developing countries) and the UK
licensing exams though less expensive are not far behind. If salaries are sufficiently
low as to make saving impossible or at least very difficult, then borrowing is the only
other option for financing a move overseas. If credit constraints are present, then
it is certainly possible that there are some doctors at the margin who would like to
migrate, but who cannot because they cannot finance the move. This raises, at least
in theory, the possibility that increasing salaries may actually lead to an increase
in migration rather than a decrease, because by increasing salaries, we loosen the
financial constraint on migration.
An intriguing alternative explanation for why raising salaries may lead to in-
creased migration is suggested by Hagopian et al. (2005). They raise the possibility
that increasing salaries may increase pass rates on foreign exams (and consequently
increase migration) because doctors can substitute away from work hours towards
study hours.
(2) It is also possible that destination country immigration restrictions act as
the binding constraint. Most countries, we know, place limits on the number of
immigrants allowed in over a given period. Imagine for example that every year m
doctors would like to migrate from i to j but there are only pm visas available where
0 < p < 1. If the number of visas that can be issued to doctors from country i is fixed
and the number of doctors wishing to migrate from i to j strictly exceeds the number
of visas available, then it is easy to show that under plausible conditions, increasing
doctors’ salaries may have no effect on the migration rate.
That immigration restrictions bind is unlikely to be true in practice however,
because doctors often have multiple routes for emigration. Take the case of the US
for example: in order to work in the US, the typical skilled worker needs a work visa,
usually the H-1B (which is capped) but physicians in training can also work on a J-1
visa (for which there is no cap).4 In addition, even though the number of work visas
(H-1B) that can be issued each year is fixed, the cap does not apply to physicians
who work at a not-for-profit hospital affiliated with an institution of higher education.
4The H-1B visa is a non-immigrant visa category which allows U.S. employers to temporarily
employ foreign workers in specialty occupations. For 2009, the H-1B cap is set at 65,000 with an
additional 20,000 visas available to those with a graduate degree from a US institution. The J-1 is
an exchange visitor visa.
40
Keep in mind also that physicians are usually accorded special status when converting
from temporary to permanent status.5
So even though at first glance it seems obvious that paying doctors more should
reduce migration, more careful consideration reveals that in fact it is not so clear.
Also as Vujicic et al. (2004) argue, if the wage premium is very high, then the wage
elasticity of migration in that range might be very small.
3.3 A brief history of wages
Wage differentials between countries in sub-Saharan Africa and OECD countries
are quite large. US physicians earn more than $100,000 annually (Guglielmo, 2003),
while wages in the UK range from 23,000-42,000 pounds for junior and mid-level
positions on average, to up to 60,000 pounds for specialists (Kangasniemi et al.,
2007). Wages in Ghana and Nigeria (two prominent exporters of physicians) on the
other hand, are estimated to range from $3,600–$12,000 per annum. As Kangasniemi
et al. rightly point out, on average, prices are lower in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) so
that the true wage differentials are smaller if one takes into account purchasing power
differences.
It is certainly plausible to think that low wages have contributed to the increase in
physician migration. In many SSA countries real wages declined during the 1980s and
1990s. Lienert and Modi (1997) document the fact that between 1986 and 1996, real
wages for civil servants fell in 26 of the 32 sub-Saharan Africa countries for which data
were available. In Nigeria for example, the official monthly wage of senior civil servants
in constant 1995 international dollars (adjusted for purchasing power) dropped from
US$820 in 1980 to US$234 in 1993 (Oluwu, 1997). Perhaps not surprisingly we find
a marked increase in migration over this period.
In recent years, several countries have attempted in various ways to increase the
pay of health workers. Tanzania implemented the Selected Accelerated Salary En-
hancement scheme (SASE) which began in 2001. This mostly affected doctors in
senior administrative positions (Dominick and Kurowski, 2004). Uganda also in-
creased health worker salaries in 2004, with junior doctors getting a 60% bump in
pay (Dambisya, 2007). Kenya in 2002 introduced various allowances for health work-
ers in the public sector which reportedly increased pay for doctors in some cases
as much as three-fold (Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006) and in 2005, the government of
5In the US for example, physicians can apply for permanent residency (green card) under a special
category defined by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
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Swaziland increased pay for all workers in the civil service including health workers
by 60% (Dambisya, 2007). This is despite the fact that we still do not know whether
salary increases reduce health professional migration, and if they do, to what extent.
Some mostly anecdotal evidence suggests that increasing salaries may have re-
duced migration. In Kenya and Swaziland for example, raising salaries resulted in
hundreds of doctors applying for civil service jobs (Mathauer and Imhoff, 2006; Kober
and Van Damme, 2006) and reduced the number of health workers exiting from the
public sector (Palmer, 2006), but there has been no systematic assessment of most of
these retention schemes (WHO, 2006). In this paper I evaluate one such program im-
plemented in Ghana, the Additional Duty Hours Allowance (ADHA) scheme. Using
innovative new econometric techniques developed by Abadie et al. (2007), I obtain
causal estimates of the impact of wages on physician migration.
3.4 Ghana’s Medical Brain Drain
Ghana currently has four medical schools. On average somewhere between 70-
150 doctors are produced each year from all the medical schools. According to data
from the World Development Indicators, Ghana has a domestic stock of about 15
physicians per 100,000 people (about 2000 physicians in total).6 Approximately two-
thirds of these serve in the public sector whilst the remainder provide services in a
variety of parastatals and in the private sector. Ghana is one of the sub-Saharan
countries most affected by health professional migration. Studies on migration of
doctors trained by the University of Ghana Medical School show that, in the ten
years between 1986 and 1995, 61 percent of the output of the Ghana Medical School
had left the country (Dovlo and Nyonator, 1999). If one expresses the number of
Ghanaian doctors abroad as a fraction of the domestic doctor stock, then about 30
percent of the domestic physician stock in Ghana is working overseas (WHO, 2006).
To make the situation even more dire, in the Awases et al. study cited earlier,
about 62 percent of the health workers surveyed in Ghana were actively considering
migrating. There is at least some suggestive evidence that migration may be taking a
toll on delivery of health services. Nurse vacancy rates in the public health sector in
Ghana increased by 100 percent between 1998 and 2002 while doctors’ vacancy rates
increased from 42.6 percent to 47.3 percent over the same period, despite supply rates
of over 100 doctors per annum (Dovlo and Nyonator, 1999; Buchan and Dovlo, 2004).
6To put this in perspective, consider that the US has about 260 physicians per 100,000 people.
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3.4.1 Ghana’s ADHA Scheme
In response to major challenges in recruiting and retaining doctors, the Ghanaian
Federal Government in 1998 instituted a scheme known as the Additional Duty Hours
Allowance (ADHA) Scheme. It was introduced as a negotiated settlement to strikes
by doctors over the issues of long hours and low pay.7 The stated objectives of the
ADHA scheme were to compensate doctors for any additional hours worked beyond the
standard 40 hours a week/160 hours a month as well as to motivate health workers for
higher performance towards provision of improved quality care (Ruwoldt et al., 2007).
A memorandum of understanding was signed between the Ghanaian government and
the Ghanaian Medical Association in December 1998 with implementation to begin
the following year.
For political reasons, the ADHA was not explicitly referred to as a salary increase
– by calling it something else, the government hoped to prevent other health workers
from demanding similar increases. In reality however, that is exactly what it was.
Doctors were allowed to claim reimbursement for up to 200 additional hours of work
per month provided the work was duly authorized and documented, but in many
cases doctors did not even have to submit claim forms to get reimbursed.8 Even
though precise estimates are hard to come by, several reports suggest that the ADHA
scheme had a significant impact on doctors incomes increasing it by as much as 150
percent (Mensah et al., 2005). Most estimates put the increase in doctors incomes
post-ADHA at between 75-150 percent.9 Note that average monthly basic salaries in
Ghana in 1999 ranged from $200-$300 depending on seniority (Dovlo and Martineau,
2004).10
The starting budget for the ADHA scheme was 3.7 billion cedis (approximately
$1.6 million)11 and over time as the program expanded to include nurses and other
public health professionals, the budget grew to 800 billion cedis in 2005 (approxi-
mately $89 million). In 2005, the Ghanaian government discontinued the ADHA and
the payments were folded into the base salary of health professionals.
How much of an impact did the ADHA scheme have on doctors’ incomes? A
2005 survey of doctors in two regions in Ghana revealed average annual incomes of
7Note that it was not primarily intended as a strategy to reduce physician migration.
8The Ghanaian Medical Association publicly stated that its members were not required to com-
plete duty rosters or submit claim forms.
9As a further sign of the impact it had, there is some evidence that the increase in incomes
allowed some health workers to purchase homes for the first time (Ruwoldt et al., 2007).
10Basic salaries make up roughly between 30-60% of salaries. Various allowances make up the
remainder.
11The exchange rate in 1998 was about 2300 cedis to $1.
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approximately $14,000, nearly half (46%) of which were ADHA payments.12 Although
the ADHA was originally intended as a bonus for working extra hours, 97% of health
workers surveyed described the ADHA as a fixed payment (Witter et al., 2007).
To date there has been no rigorous evaluation of the impact of the ADHA on
physician migration. There is some (anecdotal) evidence that the number of newly
trained doctors migrating may have declined following introduction of the ADHA, but
a 2004 report by the Ministry of Health ADHA Task force was unable to document
any reduction in migration rates of health professionals. This is not to say that it
did not have other impacts. For example, there is some evidence that it improved
job satisfaction and increased applications to nursing school (Mensah et al., 2005;
Ruwoldt et al., 2007).
3.5 Methods
The problem here is to identify the effect of the wage increase on physician migra-
tion. Under normal circumstances, this sort of problem would lend itself to standard
difference-in-difference regression methods but in this case as there is only one treated
unit, identification is more complicated. The treatment here, a salary increase, is ap-
plied at the country level, and potentially all doctors in Ghana are exposed to the
treatment. It seems reasonable therefore that the appropriate level of analysis is at
the country level especially given the fact that the outcome of interest is international
(cross-country) migration. Estimates obtained from a simple before and after analysis
of migration rates are flawed for obvious reasons and so the usual methods to identify
impacts of such programs rely on comparing the treated unit to some combination of
untreated units. Ideally one wants a comparison unit that is as similar as possible to
the treated unit.
One major drawback to the usual methods is that the choice of comparison
group(s) often relies on the researchers’ own subjective evaluation of which untreated
unit(s) are the most similar, and therefore the most relevant for comparison, to the
treated unit. Some studies avoid making a choice by simply using the set of all un-
treated units as the comparison group. If for example a policy intervention is applied
at the state level, then all the other untreated states are used as the comparison. One
of the key insights of Abadie et al. (2007), whose methods I discuss and then apply in
this paper, is that a weighted average of untreated units, where higher weights are as-
signed to unexposed units that are more similar on explicit quantifiable dimensions to
12The exchange rate in 1998 was about 9000 cedis to $1.
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the treated unit, results in a much better comparison group than one in which all the
untreated units are essentially given the same weight. In the discussion which follows
I summarize the key points from their 2007 paper with a few minor modifications.
Let J represent all the countries in the sample where j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Let E denote
exposure to some policy intervention, P , and let U denote lack of exposure. Let T0
represent the pre-intervention period and T1 represent the post-intervention period
where t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and 1 ≤ T0 < T . Let Y represent the outcome of interest.
Without loss of generality, if we assume that country 1 is the only country exposed
to the policy intervention, P , then the impact of P is given by;
α1t = Y
E
1t − Y U1t ∀t > T0
The problem is that we only observe the first term but not the second, often
referred to as the counterfactual, because the country cannot be both exposed and
unexposed at the same time. The key contribution of Abadie et al. (2007) is to show
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The insight here is that from a weighted average of all the other unexposed coun-
tries in the sample, one can construct a counterfactual Ghana without the salary
increase and then compare the migration rates in this synthetic Ghana with the ac-
tual migration rates observed in Ghana following the implementation of the ADHA
scheme. This will allow us determine whether the salary increase had the desired
impact. Obviously, a critical component of this is how the weights are determined.
The basic intuition here is that the optimal vector of weights W ∗ is one which recre-
ates, as closely as possible, the Ghana before the salary increase. More accurately, it
attempts to match as closely as possible the values of a set of predictors of migration
rates for Ghana before implementation of the ADHA scheme. More formally, W ∗
is chosen from the universe of all possible W s in order to minimize the following
function (X1 − X0W )′V (X1 − X0W ) where wj ≥ 0 and
∑J−1
j=1 wj = 1. X is
a matrix of K country characteristics which predict migration; typically defined for
t ∈ {1, . . . , T0}. The subscripts 0 and 1 denote unexposed and exposed countries
respectively.
The variables included in X are guided by the literature on the determinants
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of physician migration and they include real GDP per capita, domestic physician
stock and the lagged stock of physicians abroad (to capture network effects). Clearly,
all determinants are not created equal and so a matrix (V) assigns weights to each
determinant in relation to how strongly it predicts migration rates. V∗ is chosen to
minimize the mean square prediction error of the estimator i.e. E[(Y1−Y0W ∗)′(Y1−
Y0W
∗)]. In the absence of strong priors regarding the relative importance of each
predictor, V∗ can be chosen to minimize E[(Y1 − Y0W ∗)′(Y1 − Y0W ∗)] for t < T0
i.e. for the pre-intervention period.
3.6 Data
For this analysis, I use physician migration data collected by Alok Bhargava and
Frederic Docquier which I will hereafter refer to as the BGD (see detailed description
of this dataset in Docquier and Bhargava, 2007). The BGD measures the annual
stock of physicians from developing country i in country j where J is a set of 16
OECD countries.13 It is a panel dataset spanning the period 1991-2004. Descriptives
are in Table 4.1.
The BGD represents an ambitious attempt to present a comprehensive picture of
physician migration from the developing world, but like all pioneering efforts of this
type it suffers from a number of limitations. First of all, the definition of the emigrant
physician is not consistent thoughout the dataset. For six out of the sixteen coun-
tries: the US, UK, France, Canada, New Zealand and Norway, migrant physicians
are defined based on the country of qualification (the data is obtained from medical
registers); for six other countries: Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and
Austria, data on country of qualification is unavailable and so the definition of the
migrant physician is based on the country of birth (data comes from national censuses
and registers). Finally for the remaining four countries: Germany, Italy, Portugal and
Switzerland, neither information on country of qualification nor information on coun-
try of birth is available and so migrant physicians are defined according to citizenship
(data comes from a variety of sources). See Appendix Table 1. A second issue is the
fact that even though the BGD purports to be an annual dataset, annual data is only
available for a subset of the sample, and in the remaining cases is interpolated from
t years of census data where t ≥ 2 for all countries except Italy.14
These data problems present more or less of a challenge depending on what the
13Together these 16 countries account for more than 90 percent of all skilled immigrants in the
OECD.
14Interpolation is done using a log-linear adjustment.
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dataset is to be used for. Docquier and Bhargava (2007) argue that these issues
present less of a concern for two reasons: (1) for the majority of the data (73 percent of
the sample in 2004), migrant classification is in fact consistent – it is defined based on
country of qualification; and (2) data on migration to the most important destination
countries: the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Germany, which together account
for about 75 percent of all the medical migrants, is in fact annual and does not require
interpolation. I go further to argue that the BGD is the best data available for the
analysis presented in this paper.
There are only a handful of datasets that measure migration from African countries
to more than one destination country. Clemens and Pettersson (2008) is one example
of a cross-sectional dataset.15 To our knowledge there are only two panel datasets.
One is the BGD, the other is Okeke (2008). The latter is a panel dataset somewhat
similar to the BGD. It covers a longer time period but fewer destination countries.
In addition, while the BGD measures the annual stock of physicians, Okeke (2008)
measures the annual flow of physicians to its two destination countries, the US and
the UK. Both concepts are related. To see this, let the stock of physicians from
country i in country j at year t be Sijt and let the net flow into j in year t be Fijt
where Fijt = Iijt −Ojt. I is the gross inflow from i to j in t and O is the outflow from
j (this includes return migration to i as well as repeat migration to a different country
k 6= i). Let D represent depreciation of the physician stock each year due to death,
retirement, change of career etc. Then Sijt = Sij,t−1 + Fijt −Dj.16 Notice that if the
outflow from j is sufficiently small, then Fijt ≈ Iijt so that ∆Sij ≈ Iijt −Dj. Notice
that the change in the stock of doctors from country i in country j is an increasing
function of the inflow of doctors from i. Notice also that if the depreciation factor is
relatively constant (a not unreasonable assumption), then a decrease in Iij in year t
will have a permanent effect on Sij because it not only affects St+1, but it also affects
St+n for n > 1 through the relationship between current and lagged stock.
The BGD is preferred here primarily because it has wider coverage. It therefore
increases the probability of finding a suitable weighted average of countries that closely
resembles Ghana. In addition because it measures stock and not flow, the BGD offers
another advantage; the stock of physicians in year t is almost invariably larger than
the flow thus avoiding the problem of years with zero migration. It also helps that the
year of the intervention sits almost exactly in the middle of the period covered by the
15OECD (2005) and Mullan (2005) are two other examples.
16This is analogous to writing Sijt = (1− δj)Sij,t−1 + Fijt where δj is the country-specific depre-
ciation rate.
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BGD. In the analysis which folllows, I present results using the entire BGD sample
and as a robustness check, I restrict the sample to the four OECD countries (USA,
UK, Canada and France)17 for which the emigrant definition is consistent (based on
country of qualification) and for which there is annual data. I show that the results
are not driven by choice of sample.
3.7 Results
If the salary increase had the anticipated effect of reducing physician migration,
then we would expect to see a decrease in the outflow of physicians following the
introduction of the ADHA in 1998. Using data from Okeke (2008), I graph the
outflow of physicians from Ghana over time to the UK and compare it to the average
outflow from other ”untreated” SSA countries (see Figure 3.1). In Figure 4.3, I do
the same for migration to the US. I focus only on the US and the UK because those
two countries combined account for nearly 90 percent of all physician migration from
Ghana. Notice in Figure 3.1 the upward trend prior to 1998. Beginning in 1998
however, we see that the number of Ghanaian physicians emigrating to the UK drops
off sharply. The trend for the other countries mimics that of Ghana prior to 1998
but there is no drop-off in 1998. In fact average migration from the other countries
remains fairly steady until 2004.
The picture for the US is slightly complicated by the fact that the US Educational
Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG), the body which oversees certi-
fication of all foreign medical graduates, introduced an additional exam in 1998 that
FMGs had to now take and pass before receiving certification. Prior to 1998, the
US medical licensing exams (USMLE) consisted of two steps both of which could be
taken in various centers around the world. The introduction of an additional exam
- the Clinical Skills Assessment (CSA) - a clinical exam which could only be taken
in the US, had the effect of increasing the cost of migration for FMGs. It not only
cost more than the other two steps, it also required a trip to the US in order to take
the exam. Given an increase in the cost of migration, one would expect a decrease in
migration and this shows up in the data - for Ghana as well as for the other countries
in the sample. Notice however that the drop-off for Ghana is steeper than the average
suggesting that the introduction of the ADHA may have contributed to the overall
decrease in migration to the US. Overall, this preliminary analysis provides the first
evidence that the ADHA scheme may have reduced the migration of physicians from
17Hereafter referred to as Group 1 countries.
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Ghana. Next we turn to our main analysis.
The predictors chosen were guided by the literature on the determinants of migra-
tion as well as by data availability. The variables used include log per capita incomes
(to capture the benefits from migration – on average the wealthier the source country,
the smaller should be the benefit from migrating), the domestic stock of physicians
(to capture supply – ceteris paribus, countries with a larger domestic stock of doctors
should have a larger foreign stock) and the number of coup attempts and a dummy
for conflict (as proxies for political instability). I also include three lags of migrant
stock to capture network effects. The values of the predictors for the real Ghana, the
“synthetic” Ghana and a simple average of all the countries in the donor pool are con-
tained in Columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively in Table 4.2. Data sources are described in
Appendix A. We started out with 44 other African countries as potential candidates
for the donor pool but excluded Lesotho and Swaziland because they had zero migra-
tion over the period covered in the data. Comoros and Sao Tome were also excluded
because of missing data, and Tanzania and Kenya were excluded because similar pro-
grams were implemented there over the time period covered in this analysis. Lastly
we exclude South Africa because it is in many ways atypical amongst sub-Saharan
African countries.18 The final sample consists of 37 countries. The primary outcome
variable is
∑J
j=1 Sijt, the total migrant stock of physicians from country i.
Table 3.1: Predictors
Variable Ghana Synthetic Average
Log GDP per capita 7.08 6.63 7.17
Lagged foreign stock (1991) 423.09 423.22 88.99
Lagged foreign stock (1993) 513.17 517.96 110.85
Lagged foreign stock (1997) 586.78 587.18 130.05
Coup attempts 0.00 0.01 0.11
Conflict 0.00 0.34 0.20
Log domestic physician stock 1.86 1.52 2.01
All variables except lagged foreign stock are averaged for 1991-1997
Looking at the results in Table 4.2, we see that the synthetic Ghana formed from
a weighted average of untreated countries is very similar to the real Ghana on a set
of variables which predict migration. The one exception is the conflict variable which
turns out to be a very weak predictor of migration rates and is thus assigned a small
weight in the weighting matrix, V . Ghana is one of the more stable countries in the
18Amongst other things, it is itself an important destination country (see Clemens, 2007).
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sample and experiences no conflict between 1991 and 2004. We also notice that a
simple average of the other countries in the pool does not provide a good comparison
for the treated unit, Ghana. Notice that while an average of the other countries
matches the pre-intervention values of Ghana on some of the predictor variables, it
provides a very poor approximation on all of the lagged stock variables which are
important predictors of migration rates. It is evident from Figure 3.1 and Figure 4.3
that Ghana in terms of raw numbers has a high physician migration rate relative to
the average.
In Table 3.4 we show the optimal weighting matrix W ∗. The best approxima-
tion of Ghana is a weighted average of five SSA countries: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan,
Uganda and Zimbabwe. All the other countries are assigned a zero weight. In Fig-
ure 3.3, I plot the outcome for Ghana and the synthetic control for each year in the
data. The results confirm what we already suspected from looking at flow data: the
ADHA scheme appears to have had an impact on migration. Prior to 1998, migration
in the synthetic control Ghana tracks very closely with actual migration but shortly
after 1998, the lines start to diverge. We also see that the effect on foreign migrant
stock is increasing, which is consistent with theory. This result is quite compelling.
By 2004, there are approximately 100 fewer Ghanaian doctors abroad than there
would have been if the ADHA program had not been implemented. This is not a
trivial number. A decrease of 100 physicians amounts to roughly 16 percent of the
mean foreign migrant stock (of Ghanaian doctors) in all 16 OECD countries, and
approximately 7 percent of the mean domestic stock. Alternatively, relative to what
the foreign migrant stock would have been in 2004 had the ADHA scheme not been
implemented, this translates to a 10 percent decrease in emigration.
As a robustness check, and to address some of the data problems inherent with the
BGD, we repeat the analyses for a smaller subset of OECD countries: the US, UK,
Canada and France. For these four countries, the data is annual and the definition of
the emigrant is consistent throughout the sample.19 Results from a balancing test for
this sample of four destination countries are in Table 4.3. With this sub-sample of the
data, the weighting matrix assigns positive weights to Ethiopia, Nigeria, Madagascar,
Uganda and Zambia and zero weights to all the other countries (see Table 4.4).
Overall, the results are quite similar to results obtained using the larger sample. We
find a decrease of about 130 physicians in the foreign migrant stock by 2004 relative
to the counterfactual. This translates to an approximately 13 percent decrease in
emigration.
19Emigrant classification is based on the country of qualification.
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Table 3.2: Predictors (Group 1 countries alone)
Variable Ghana Synthetic Average
Log GDP per capita 7.08 6.74 7.17
Lagged foreign stock (1991) 310 306.65 88.99
Lagged foreign stock (1993) 392 395.49 110.85
Lagged foreign stock (1997) 455 453.91 130.05
Coup attempts 0.00 0.07 0.11
Conflict 0.00 0.25 0.20
Log domestic physician stock 1.86 1.86 2.01
All variables except lagged foreign stock are averaged for 1991-1997
In alternative models, we use migrant stock per capita as the outcome variable
i.e.
∑J
j=1 Sijt/Popit. We also express the lagged foreign stock and the domestic
physician stock in per capita terms. Results from this alternative specification (not
shown) do not show the same striking pattern. It is not a priori clear though that
expressing the migrant stock in per capita terms offers any significant advantages
over expressing it in levels. While the per capita version of the variable allows for
some comparability across countries, that is not the point of this analysis. At the
same time, interpretation of the results when the outcome is expressed as a fraction of
domestic population is less straightforward. Saying that the ADHA scheme reduced
the foreign migrant stock by 25 doctors, we think, is more meaningful (and easier to
understand) than saying that it reduced the foreign migrant stock by 0.5 doctors per
1,000 domestic population in Ghana.
Next we estimate a model in which all the comparison countries are weighted
equally. This would be akin to using all the available untreated countries as a com-
parison group within the standard regression framework. The question we ask is “how
would the results differ if we used all the available untreated countries as a comparison
group?” Not surprisingly, the resulting synthetic control is a very poor approximation
of Ghana and does not do a good job of reproducing the time path of the outcome
variable before the intervention (results not shown). One cannot therefore say with
confidence that the post-intervention differences in outcomes between Ghana and its
comparison group are not as a result of underlying differences in characteristics.
One way of examining the robustness of our findings is to replicate the experiment
in a different setting. The question we ask is “if we applied the same methods to
a different country which implemented a similar type of program, would we find
similar results?” To answer that question, we turn to Tanzania. Tanzania in 2001
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implemented a program called the Selected Accelerated Salary Enhancement scheme
(SASE) which also increased doctors’ incomes (Dominick and Kurowski, 2004). If
we are able to document similar findings for a very different country over a different
time period, it adds some credibility to our findings for Ghana. We’ve chosen to use
Tanzania over the other countries which implemented some type of salary support
program for doctors because it gives us the longest post-intervention period (3 years).
The purpose of this exercise is not to estimate the causal impact of the program in
Tanzania – because amongst other reasons we do not have as good a grasp of the
institutional details as we do for Ghana – all we are trying to do here is to see if we
can replicate our findings in a different context. We use the same set of predictor
variables, but include four lags of foreign stock (1993, 1996, 1998 and 2000). Those
results are in Figure 3.4. We find a similar pattern. Both lines start to diverge about
a year before the program start date.20 An important caveat though is that these
results are not as robust as our main results for Ghana. They are somewhat sensitive
to the choice of which variables (or which lags) we include.
Conventional tests of significance cannot be used with the synthetic control method
and so to evaluate the statistical significance of our results, we conduct a series of
placebo studies in which we iteratively assign the treatment to the other countries in
the donor pool. The idea is to generate a distribution of outcomes for the untreated
countries to which we can then compare our results. If our results are unusually large
relative to the results obtained for the untreated countries, then we conclude that the
ADHA program had a statistically significant impact. The outcome here is αjt i.e.
the difference in the dependent variable between the treated unit j and it’s synthetic
control. In Figure 3.5 we graph the distribution of outcomes for all the countries
in the sample and compare it to Ghana’s. The decrease for Ghana (dotted line) is
clearly unusual relative to the other countries. There is only one other country which
has a decrease larger than Ghana’s and that may simply be due to poor fit – notice
that the pre-intervention gap is also large. This translates to a probability of 5.5%
(2/36).21
20This would be consistent with an anticipatory effect. Because we do not know the institutional
details, it may very well be that the government announced the program a year or two before actual
implementation.
21We omit Nigeria because no convex combination of the other countries is able to approximate
outcomes for Nigeria. This is not surprising because it has the highest foreign migrant stock outside
of South Africa, which we already exclude. The root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) for the
pre-intervention period is approximately 1,110.
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3.8 Conclusion
Increasing the incomes of health professionals in developing countries is often men-
tioned as a way to reduce emigration to richer countries. To our knowledge, this study
is the first to provide estimates of the impact of increasing doctors’ salaries. While
the earnings differential between physicians in developing and developed countries is
clearly an important factor contributing to physician migration, there has before now
been very little direct evidence concerning what the potential impact of increasing
salaries might be. In this paper, we exploit a natural experiment to estimate the
impact of wages on physician migration. Using innovative new methods developed by
(Abadie et al., 2007) and applying it to data collected by Alok Bhargava and Frederic
Docquier (2007), we find that six years after Ghana implemented a salary increase
program known as the Additional Duty Hours Allowance (ADHA) scheme, the foreign
stock of Ghanaian doctors abroad had fallen by approximately 100 physicians relative
to what it would have been without the program. This translates to roughly a 10
percent decrease in emigration. As a way of estimating how significant this decrease
was, we iteratively assigned the treatment to the other unexposed countries in the
sample and show that the decrease in the foreign stock for Ghana is very unusual
relative to the distribution of outcomes for the other countries.
Our work has a number of limitations. First, even though we conducted an ex-
tensive review of the literature to identify (and exclude) countries that implemented
some kind of large-scale program between 1991 and 2004, it is possible that we still
have included countries which implemented some kind of program to reduce physi-
cian migration. In other words, it is possible that some of the comparison countries
are actually treated countries. This is not a problem if those countries are assigned
a zero weight in the weighting matrix. If however, one of the countries assigned a
positive weight is in reality a treated country, then our results will be biased towards
understating the true effect.
Secondly, we are unable to control for any Ghana-specific shock which coincided
with the start of the ADHA program. Our estimates of the impact of the program
will be biased if there was some other unobserved shock in 1998 in Ghana that also
affected physician migration.22 The direction of the bias will depend on whether
the unobserved shock is positively or negatively correlated with migration. If we
had data for another professional group in Ghana which was not affected by the
22Personal communication from Ghanaian officials at the Ministry of Health assure us that this
was not the case.
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ADHA scheme (engineers for example), it would be possible to separately identify
the effect of the ADHA program. Similar panel data for a different professional group
to our knowledge is unavailable.23 To assuage this concern however, we run the same
experiment for Tanzania which implemented a similar type of program in 2001. We
find some evidence again of a decrease in the foreign migrant stock. This suggests
that our results for Ghana are not driven by some unobserved shock that coincided
with the start of the ADHA.
Another concern is that the ADHA scheme may have had other components e.g.
a subsidized loan to enable purchase of a car, so that all of the impact of the program
could not be attributed to a salary increase. In actual fact, and this is unusual for a
program of this size, the ADHA was purely a salary support program.24
When we look at all of the evidence, starting with the obvious reduction in the
flow of physicians from Ghana beginning in 1998 when the ADHA was implemented
(Figure 3.1 and Figure 4.3), to the decrease in the foreign stock of Ghanaian doctors
that is evident from our main results (Figure 3.3) and ending with our robustness
check which finds a similar pattern for Tanzania which implemented a similar type of
program, the evidence is persuasive. It is hard to argue that the ADHA scheme did
not reduce the emigration of physicians from Ghana. To the extent that one accepts
our findings, it is possible to do a simple back of the envelope calculation to gauge
the cost-effectiveness of the program. One can also calculate a rough elasticity. If
the ADHA scheme increased salaries by between 75 and 150 percent and we find a 10
percent decrease in emigration, that translates to an elasticity of between -0.07 and
-0.13.
There are clearly valid concerns about the political feasibility of increasing salaries
of doctors; not to mention the economic ability of developing countries to do so.
One problem is that it is a slippery slope: how does one increase salaries for one
professional group without increasing salaries for other groups? As we discuss early in
the paper, Ghana ran into exactly that problem and had to dramatically increase the
budget to accommodate other health professionals. Any effort to evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of such a program must therefore take this spillover effect into account.
23We thought about using nurses but they were also affected by the ADHA.
24Personal communication from the Ministry of Health, Ghana.
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Figure 3.1: Physician Emigration to the UK
Figure 3.2: Physician Emigration to the US
55
Figure 3.3: Did the ADHA scheme have an effect?
Figure 3.4: Do we find similar results for the SASE program in Tanzania?
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Figure 3.5: Placebo Test
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Table 3.3: Descriptives
Country Foreign Stock Fraction∗ Dom. Stock Pop/1000
Benin 9.5 .73 331 5843
Botswana 20 0 401 1566
Burkina Faso 1.8 .048 395 10641
Burundi 21 .12 352 6470
CAR 4 .7 133 3511
Cameroon 106 .25 1118 14227
Cape Verde 83 0 78 409
Chad 2.9 .54 223 7307
Congo 61 .66 820 3191
Cote D’Ivoire 10 .21 1320 14781
DRC 201 .073 3171 46582
Equatorial Guinea 1 .23 108 430
Eritrea 8.9 0 105 3833
Ethiopia 445 .31 1569 60644
Gabon 2.9 0 323 1180
Gambia 7.1 0 36 1210
Ghana 635 .79 1392 18463
Guinea 76 .021 760 6990
Guinea-Bissau 1.6 .19 213 1279
Kenya 235 .45 3563 28307
Liberia 44 .84 68 2936
Madagascar 31 .85 2104 14433
Malawi 46 .18 222 9801
Mali 16 .82 497 10235
Mauritania 1.7 0 298 2474
Mauritius 79 .041 978 1153
Mozambique 25 .047 294 16733
Namibia 5.8 0 477 1764
Niger 3.2 .67 294 9892
Nigeria 2408 .92 29613 118926
Rwanda 14 .076 178 7233
Senegal 26 .54 791 8913
Sierra Leone 26 .092 348 4762
Somalia 109 .07 340 8312
South Africa 10826 .83 26264 41362
Sudan 729 .64 3729 29730
Tanzania 101 .32 971 31552
Togo 33 .53 267 4205
Uganda 368 .78 909 21785
Zambia 144 .72 672 9345
Zimbabwe 266 .54 1193 11997
* Fraction of foreign stock of doctors in the Group 1 countries (USA, UK, Canada and France)
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What is the Price of Prevention? New Evidence
from a Field Experiment
4.1 Introduction
Cervical cancer is the most common cancer among women in developing countries
and the second most common among women worldwide (Walraven, 2003). Within
the developing world, some of the highest rates of incidence are to be found in Africa
- estimates range from about 36 per 100,000 in Mali to 42 per 100,000 in Uganda.
In contrast, rates lower than 5 per 100,000 are found in most developed countries
(Parkin et al., 2002). Because the disease is often diagnosed late in developing coun-
tries, attendant mortality is high. Of the nearly 300,000 deaths occurring worldwide
from cervical cancer in 2002, more than 80 percent were in developing countries
(Sankaranarayanan, 2006).
It is by now well known that cervical cancer is preventable. It is caused by per-
sistent infection with human papilloma virus (HPV)1 and develops slowly over 10-15
years. Prior to the development of invasive cancer however, cervical cells undergo
pre-cancerous changes which can be detected and then treated. This reduces signifi-
cantly a woman’s risk of ever developing cervical cancer. There is some evidence that
the large declines in cervical cancer incidence and mortality documented in many
developed countries over the last half century have been due at least in part to the
institution and maintenance of broad-based population screening programs (Antilla
et al., 1999; Sankaranarayanan et al., 2001). Cervical cancer incidence rates have
been reduced by as much as 80 percent in countries where screening rates and follow-
up are high. Despite this, screening rates in many developing countries remain low
(IARC, 2004). Gakidou et al. (2008) in a recent paper estimate that only about 19
1Over 99% of cervical cancers contain HPV DNA. (Walboomers et al., 1999)
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percent of women, in the 30 developing countries for which they had data, had been
screened within the last three years, compared to 63 percent on average in developed
countries. In some countries like Ethiopia, the coverage rate was 1 percent.
These low screening rates can perhaps be blamed in part on lack of access to
cervical screening; but even where screening programs exist, take-up rates are still low
(Lazcano-Ponce et al., 1999). This becomes crucial when one considers that coverage
rates have been identified as critical to the success or failure of cervical screening
(World Health Organization, 2002). Various factors have been mentioned as possible
barriers to take-up of screening ranging from poor information (Lartey et al., 2003),
to cost (Bishop et al., 1995). In this study we eliminate the supply explanation by
making screening available.2 We then investigate the extent to which demand-side
factors affect take-up of the program. In this paper we identify the impact of prices
and estimate the effect of providing a subsidy for cancer treatment on participation
in the program.
We find a qualitatively and quantitatively signicant impact of both interventions.
A N10 increase in the price of screening reduces take-up of the program by between
0.7 and 0.8 percentage points - a decline of approximately 20 percent - while women
selected to receive the cancer treatment subsidy were about 4 percentage points more
likely to participate in screening - an increase of approximately 30 percent.
This paper makes a contribution to several related yet distinct areas of the lit-
erature. First, we make a contribution to the broader literature on the demand for
preventive care, next, by identifying the impact of price on take-up, we make a con-
tribution to the literature on user fees in developing countries, thirdly, we make a
contribution to the literature on the psychological costs of testing and the use of
conditional subsidies to induce desired health behaviors, and lastly, we add to the
small but growing literature in development economics which studies the impacts of
interventions using small scale field experiments. We review some of the relevant
literature in the next section.
2We realize that there are supply-side factors other than availability of the program that are
important, for example the quality of care provided, but for the purposes of this study, these are
second-order concerns.
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4.2 Previous work and theoretical considerations
4.2.1 Demand for Preventive care
There are clear differences between preventive and curative care. One important
difference is that preventive care, unlike curative care, is typically purchased before
the health state is known. It is also clear that these differences have important
implications for the demand for preventive medical care (see Cropper, 1977; Kenkel,
2000).3
A substantial amount of research has been done to identify the impact of price on
the demand for preventive care (Newhouse and Insurance Experiment Group, 1993;
Kenkel, 1994; Stoner et al., 1998; Friedman et al., 2002). Data from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment, arguably the gold standard in the literature, suggests price
elasticities of between 0.17 and 0.43 (Newhouse and Insurance Experiment Group,
1993). Much of this work though has been done in developed countries where health
insurance is widely available. This presents a number of conceptual as well as method-
ological challenges.
First, health insurance plans often have an array of copayments, coinsurance rates,
and deductibles in addition to regular premiums. This can make determining the rel-
evant price difficult. It also means that estimates obtained from different studies may
not be directly comparable depending on whether they exploit changes in coinsurance
rates, changes in copayments or changes in deductibles (Solanki et al., 2000). Sec-
ondly, variation in price tends to be small, with identification often based off of small
differences in co-payments (Trivedi et al., 2008). Thirdly, health insurance choices -
including generosity of coverage, are endogenous and studies differ in their ability to
control for selection effects. Another important challenge is that in the presence of
health insurance, the demand for preventive care depends on the coverage for cura-
tive care. Pauly (1986) for example argues that generous coverage for curative care
diminishes the incentives to invest in preventive care. Kenkel (1994) on the other
hand argues that preventive and curative care may be complements rather than sub-
stitutes. This suggests that any attempts to estimate price elasticities for preventive
care must carefully control for the generosity of coverage for curative care because of
the possibility of moral hazard.
We make a contribution to this literature by providing clean estimates of the
impact of price on demand for a preventive service, cervical screening. We avoid
3One implication for example is that the demand for preventive care is likely to be more price
elastic (Ringel et al., 2002).
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endogeneity concerns by randomly assiging price and because health insurance is not
available in this environment we are able to estimate “pure” price elasticities.
4.2.2 User fees
There is a fairly large literature studying the impacts of user fees on utilization
of health care in developing countries. James et al. (2006) and Lagarde and Palmer
(2008) conduct excellent reviews of this literature. Though much of this literature
does not discuss this explicitly, the underlying parameter of interest is the price
elasticity of demand, because it is crucial for determining how health services should
be priced. Most of these studies show significant increases (decreases) in utilization
following removal (introduction) of user fees (Collins et al., 1996; Wilkinson et al.,
2001; Ridde, 2003; Nabyonga et al., 2005). Though large in quantity, the average
quality of many of these studies is low (see Lagarde and Palmer, 2008, for a critique
of the existing literature). In addition, comparatively few studies have continuous
variation in price (Abdu et al., 2004; Bratt et al., 2002, are notable exceptions), and
even fewer examine utilization of preventive services (Bratt et al., 2002, is an example
of one which does).4 Many key questions therefore remain unresolved.
In addition to providing clean estimates of the effect of price on take-up of a
preventive health care service, we examine a key assumption of those that advocate
for user fees, namely that price serves to allocate resources to those who need it
the most. We implement a simple test of this hypothesis by investigating whether
women at higher risk of developing cervical cancer are also those with the highest
willingness-to-pay. We contrast results obtained using a subjective measure of risk
with results using an objective risk measure based on evidence from the medical
literature. We also address the concern about the equity of user fees – a key concern
of those who advocate against user fees – by providing estimates of the extent to
which price responsiveness differs by household wealth.
4.2.2.1 Field Experiments
In recent years there has been an explosion in the number of randomized ex-
periments being conducted in developing countries (see the overview of this growing
field in Duflo, 2006). One notable spillover effect of this has been that experimental
methodology is now increasingly being applied to pressing questions relevant to health
policy. As should be evident from the preceding discussion, one of such questions is
4Part of the problem perhaps is that in many cases, preventive services were free.
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the impact of pricing on take-up of various health services. This is still the subject
of much debate.
On the one hand, advocates of charging positive prices argue that higher prices
screen out individuals with low demand, and that when products or services are given
away for free, they are not valued as much (Family Health International, 2005).5 On
the other hand, those who advocate for zero prices point to earlier work which found
dramatic declines in utilization of health services when user fees were introduced.
They also raise concerns about equity and argue that zero prices may be optimal
especially if large externalities are present (Dupas, 2005).
Three recent papers (all field experiments) have attempted to provide some clarity
to the debate on the impact of prices on take-up/use of health services/products. All
three, coincidentally, deal with some form of prevention. In Ashraf et al. (2007), a
water disinfectant product was offered for sale to households in Zambia at randomly
chosen prices.6 They found that take-up of the product decreased at higher price
levels: a 100kw increase in the offer price resulted in a 7 percentage point reduction
in the probability of take-up - an elasticity of about -0.6. They also examined the
question of whether those who paid higher prices (conditional on the initial offer price)
were more likely to use the product: they found statistically insignificant effects.
Lastly, they examined whether prices served to target the product to those who
could benefit from it the most (families with young children and pregnant women)
and found no evidence.
Miguel and Kremer (2004) is a widely cited study on the effects of a deworming
program on schooling in Kenya. Three years after this program was introduced,
the NGO administering the program started charging parents for the deworming
drugs. Kremer and Miguel (2007) found that take-up of the deworming medication
fell dramatically after introduction of user fees. In the treatment schools relative to
the control schools, take-up fell by 56 percentage points (note that the “treatment”
here is cost-sharing. Both treatment and control schools were part of the deworming
program). They found however that conditional on a positive price being charged,
take-up did not vary with higher prices. They also found no evidence that higher
prices helped to target treatment to children with the most need.
Cohen and Dupas (2007) studied the impact of prices on take-up and use of
insecticide-treated bednets (ITN) among pregnant women in Kenya.7 They found
5They also argue that these fees are necessary long-term sustainability of health programs.
6This was done via a door-to-door marketing campaign.
7The bednets were distributed at antenatal clinics.
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reduced take-up of ITNs at clinics with higher prices. Relative to clinics offering
ITNs for free, take-up rates at clinics offering nets at 10 Ksh, 20 Ksh and 40 Ksh
were respectively 7, 17 and 61 percentage points lower. They also found no evidence
that prices helped to target ITNs to women with the most need. Pregnant women
paying higher prices were no sicker – as evidenced by blood hemoglobin levels – than
women in the comparison group. Holla and Kremer (2009) however suggest that
this latter finding might be due to credit constraints, arguing that the sickest women
would also be those with the least ability to pay.
We reexamine some of these findings within the context of a clinic-based preventive
service. We argue that water disinfectant, deworming medication and ITNs may not
be viewed as “health care” products quite in the same way as cervical screening, which
is usually performed by a nurse/doctor in a clinic. All three products for example, can
be purchased in any general goods store or supermarket in most developing countries.
In addition, it is more than likely that other viable substitutes existed that were used
by the individuals in the study before the new technology was introduced which might
explain the large reductions in demand when prices were raised. In particular, the
result in Kremer and Miguel (2007) may represent a “legacy” or “entitlement” effect
because the families were used to the deworming medication being given away for
free. Raising the price might be seen as unfair and would tend to have large impacts
in the short run. Presumably though the impact over the longer-term would be less
dramatic as families adjusted (Benjamin et al., 2001).
4.2.3 Psychological costs of testing
Each time one gets tested for a disease, there is a theoretical chance of finding
out that one has the disease. A growing body of work in behavioral economics sug-
gests that fear of bad news is one reason why people are reluctant to get tested, or
conditional on getting tested, why they are reluctant to learn the results (Caplin and
Leahy, 2001; Caplin and Eliaz, 2003; Camerer et al., 2003; Koszegi, 2003). Some of
this work suggests that if individuals are particularly averse to receiving bad news,
then strategic ignorance can be an optimal outcome. The importance of this effect
has been questioned in practice though (see Thornton, 2008).
While fear of bad news might be an important reason why screening rates are
low (see for example Lerman et al., 1996), we posit that a simpler, more benign
explanation may be at work. As Eddy (1980) argues, a medical test is only useful to
the extent to which the information gained allows one to improve one’s prognosis.8 If
8Strictly speaking, the information is also useful, independent of its effect on prognosis, if it
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no treatment exists for the disease, then finding out that one has the disease imposes
utility costs without offsetting gains and there is very little incentive to get tested.9
By the same token, if treatment exists but is unaffordable, the incentive to get tested
is diminished.10 In developing countries where health insurance is not yet widely
available and most private health care expenditures represent out-of-pocket costs, we
argue that the latter explanation might be more important. Consistent with this line
of reasoning, cost of treatment is often cited as a major barrier to receiving medical
care (World Bank, 2005).
We test our hypothesis by offering a conditional cancer treatment subsidy to a
randomly chosen subset of women. The subsidy is only paid out in the event that
the woman is diagnosed with cervical cancer. If fear of receiving bad news is the
dominant explanation, then the subsidy should have little or no effect. If on the other
hand, women are reluctant to get tested because they are sensibly concerned that if
diagnosed with the disease, treatment might be unaffordable, then one will expect a
qualitatively and quantitatively significant increase in the take-up rate among women
selected to receive the treatment subsidy relative to women in the control group.
One might also expect this effect to be strongest among women from the poorest
households.
4.3 A Simple Model
To formalize the intuition in the previous section, I develop a simple two-period
expected utility model similar to the model in ?. Like ? I assume that utility is a
function of health status H, where H captures both quantity as well as quality of
life. In the first period, each woman decides whether or not to undergo screening at
a cost of c to obtain information about her health. Let us assume that the woman
can only belong to one of thee possible health states denoted by the subscript i where
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Without loss of generality, let us further assume that State 1 is the
healthy state i.e. H = H1 if the woman is healthy. If i 6= 1, then the woman is ill.
Let the probability of each state be denoted by pi. For simplicity, I assume that the
screening test is completely accurate. Without screening, her exact state of health is
not revealed until the next period.
The expected utility (EU0) if the woman chooses not to undergo screening is given
allows the individual make valuable lifestyle changes.
9This may have been the case in the early days of AIDS.
10There is another margin along which this might operate: if the test itself is imperfect i.e. low
sensitivity and/or specificity, then the information learned might have little value.
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by the following expression:
EU0 = p1U(H1) + p2U(H2) + p3U(H3) (4.1)
Since the probability of being health is one minus the probability of being sick,
this reduces to:
EU0 = (1− p2 − p3)U(H1) + p2U(H2) + p3U(H3) (4.2)
To capture the salient features of cervical cancer screening, let us assume that
i = 2 corresponds to having a pre-cancerous lesion and i = 3 corresponds to having
cervical cancer. The point of screening is to find and treat women with pre-cancerous
lesions which may later develop into cervical cancer. If that transition probability is
r, then H2 is really a weighted probability of H1 and H3, so that (2) can be rewritten
as:
EU0 = (1− p2 − p3)U(H1) + p2[rU(H3) + (1− r)U(H1)] + p3U(H3) (4.3)
If the woman undergoes screening and the test reveals that the woman is ill, she
can undergo treatment costing C. We do not use a subscript because C1 = 0, and
in this experiment, the cost of treatment for a pre-cancerous lesion is included in the
cost of screening, c, so that C2 is also zero, C therefore refers to the cost of treatment
for cervical cancer. Let us assume that treatment is always effective and restores the
woman to a level of health, H∗ where H3 < H
∗ < H1. Let us also assume that if
the screening test reveals that the woman has a pre-cancerous lesion, she will receive
treatment, and post-treatment, will never develop cervical cancer. In other words,
treatment reduces r to 0. The expected utility (EU1) if the woman chooses to undergo




EU1 = (1− p3)U(H1 − c) + p3[αU(H∗ − c− C) + (1− α)U(H3 − c)] (4.5)
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In this environment, average incomes are low,11 formal credit markets are almost
non-existent, and there is no health insurance. Cancer treatment which will require
multiple visits to the hospital (for initial evaluation, treatment and follow-up) is also
only available at the teaching hospital, more than four hours away. There is therefore
a distinct possibility that a woman diagnosed with cancer will be unable to pay for
treatment. We denote this probability in the model by α. One can therefore think
about α as an affordability parameter.
Clearly, the woman will only demand screening if EU1 > EU0. The expected
value of screening, EV is therefore given by: EV = EU1 − EU0 > 0. If we expand
and gather like terms, we obtain the following expression:
EV = p3[αU(H
∗ − c− C) + (1− α)U(H3 − c)− U(H3)]− (4.6)
p2[rU(H3) + (1− r)U(H1)] +
(1− p3)U(H1 − c)− (1− p2 − p3)U(H1) > 0
From (6), we see that if the woman believes that she is healthy (p2 = p3 = 0), she
will not demand screening because U(H1 − c)− U(H1) < 0. Differentiating (5) with







This suggests that varying the cost of both screening and treatment will have an
impact on the demand for cervical screening.
4.4 Program Description
This study was implemented in Akoko North-West local government, one of nine-
teen local governments in Ondo State, South-west Nigeria.12 The population of this
local government is approximately 200,000 (National Population Commission, 2006).
We chose to implement this study here primarily because the infrastructure for a
cervical screening program already existed. An attempt to implement a population-
based screening program was begun in 2006 as a collaborative effort between the
11They also vary over time. Only about 31% of the women in this sample who describe themselves
as employed are in regular wage employment.
12A local government area is similar in style to a US county.
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local government, a community-based NGO and physicians at the regional teaching
hospital. The NGO provided funding which was used to create awareness about the
disease and to train community health workers in visual inspection techniques for
cervical screening (see Appendix A). In theory, screening was then supposed to be
available at the primary health care clinics in each community within the local gov-
ernment at a subsidized price which covered not just screening, but also treatment
of any pre-cancerous lesions using cryotherapy (again see Appendix A). In reality,
the program never really attained wide coverage, and in all, only about a couple of
hundred women were ever screened (most of them around the time when the program
was launched). However the framework still existed and so we provided funding so
that the program could again be offered. For logistical reasons, we offered the pro-
gram in one community. Screening was provided through the local primary health
care center.
To create awareness about the program, we sought audience with the local tra-
ditional ruler and his council of chiefs, we also engaged the services of a town-crier
and recruited field workers who went door-to-door to tell women about the screening
program. Between November 2008 and February 2009, we carried out an enumeration
exercise to create a sampling frame, and 960 households were drawn to participate
in this study. The remainder of the study was carried out between March 2009 and
August 2009.
4.5 The Experiment
Each household selected to participate in this study was visited by a trained female
interviewer who conducted an interview with all eligible women in the household.
Eligibility was defined based on gender (female), age (18-64) and medical history
(no previous hysterectomy). We also excluded all women who had ever been screened
before. Once the interview was completed, the interviewer spent some time educating
each woman about cervical cancer and the benefits of cervical screening (based on a
cervical cancer resource guide/fact sheet which was later given to the woman) and
then administered two experimental interventions:
4.5.1 Screening Price
Within each household, after the interviews were completed, the interviewer gath-
ered all eligible women in the household and informed them that screening was going
to be provided at a subsidized price but that the exact price each household would pay
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would be determined by playing a game. The women were then shown a scratch card
with three covered circles numbered 1-3 and told that each covered circle concealed a
price. The price schedule consisted of three prices: N0, N50 and N100.13 The rules of
the game were simple: one woman would choose one of the numbered circles and the
price underneath the covered circle would be the price all the women in the household
would pay. The women were then asked to choose among themselves someone to play
the game on behalf of all the women in the household.14 The game concluded by
asking the elected woman to scratch off the sticker and the resulting price was an-
nounced by the interviewer. A dated, signed price voucher in that amount was then
issued to each eligible woman in the household. Each voucher was person-specific –
it contained the name and unique ID of each eligible woman and could only be used
by that woman.
We went to a great deal of effort to ensure that the experiment worked as planned.
First of all, the price vouchers were very distinctive and could not be duplicated with-
out considerable effort.15 Secondly, the prices assigned to each numbered circle were
varied randomly so that neither the interviewer nor the respondent could know which
numbered circle concealed what price. Thirdly, the scratch cards were individually
numbered and had to be returned at the end of each working day to the field super-
visor who then cross-checked to make sure only one circle had been scratched off and
that the others had not been tampered with. That our randomization strategy was
successful is evident from Figure 1.
We hypothesized that women receiving higher prices would be less likely to take-up
the screening program.
4.5.2 Cancer Treatment Subsidy
During the interview, each woman received detailed information about the benefits
of cervical screening in terms of reducing the risk of ever developing the disease. They
were told that the price of screening included treatment of any pre-cancerous lesions.
They were also told that there was a very small risk of being diagnosed with invasive
cancer.16 If that diagnosis was made, they would be referred to the teaching hospital
for further treatment and as is normal in Nigeria, would be responsible for the cost
13The currency in Nigeria is known as the Naira (N). $1 ≈ N150.
14If there was only one eligible woman in the household, then she was chosen by default.
15This is actually an understatement because the technology to duplicate the vouchers was not
available in the community.
16The interviewers were instructed to tell the women that the prevalence was between 3 and 4 per
10,000 women.
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of their treatment. They were then offered an opportunity to receive a subsidy for
cancer treatment (if it became necessary) by playing another game. The subsidy
would cover the cost of treatment at the teaching hospital up to a maximum of
N100,000 and would only be paid out in the (unlikely) event that invasive cancer was
diagnosed. The game was similar to the first one but with only two outcomes.17 At
the conclusion of the game, the women were informed whether they were eligible to
receive the subsidy or not.
We hypothesized that women selected to receive the treatment subsidy would be
more likely to take up the screening program.
4.6 Data and results
We have data on approximately 1100 women from 912 households.18 Summary
statistics are in Table 4.2. The mean age is 36.3 years, 68 percent of the women
are married and the average length of schooling is nine years. About 70 percent
describe themselves as employed – 22 percent have regular wage employment, 36
percent are self-employed (most have a small scale business), and 9 percent report
self-employment in agriculture. In terms of ethnicity and religion, this is a relatively
homogenous sample. The average household size is five and on average there are
two bedrooms for sleeping. About a quarter of households report owning a motor
vehicle, 41 percent own a refrigerator and nearly 60 percent of households report that
at least one member of the household has a bank account. The vast majority of
households have electricity (90%) and 23 percent of households describe their main
source of drinking water as pipe-borne water. For the most part, this appears to be
a fairly healthy population; more than 90 percent of the women describe their health
as good or better, and only 8 percent report being in poor health. 47 percent of
women describe the local government hospital as their usual source of care; about 14
percent usually seek care at one of the two primary health care centers (including the
one where this study is sited). A non-trivial fraction of women (17%) report having
infrequent contact with the health system; their preferred source of care is a nearby
drug dispensary or a traditional healer (1.2 percent).
Overall, about 35 percent of women drew a zero price (these women are the control
group), 33 percent drew a price of N50 and about 32 percent drew the highest price
17We again used a scratch card but this time with only two covered circles only identified as A
and B.
18The vast majority of women agreed to participate in the study. Less than 1% of women refused
to participate.
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of N100. In Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, we graph the distribution of price and the
conditional subsidy. In neither case can we reject the null of equality of proportions
across treatment and control groups. Though we designed the experiment such that
both treatments would be orthogonal, in Figure 4.3 we test for the equality of the
price distribution across the treatment (Subsidy = Yes) and control groups (Subsidy
= No). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the null of equality of distributions;
the p-value is 0.6.
Next we test whether our randomization strategy was successful. If price was
distributed randomly, then it should be entirely unrelated to either individual or
household characteristics. In Table 4.3, we regress each of our treatments on a va-
riety of individual and household characteristics. For the most part we see that our
randomization worked; none of the covariates are statistically significant in the price
regression (Column 1). As for the subsidy, women receiving the subsidy appeared to
be slightly younger and more likely to come from a smaller household. They are also
more likely to report using a flush toilet. In all subsequent models, we include these
variables as control variables. Reassuringly, none of the other variables appear to be
correlated with receipt of the subsidy.
4.6.1 Did the interventions have an impact?
We begin by looking at the impact of price. We can estimate the magnitude of
the impact by taking a simple difference of means. The take-up of screening in the
control group (Price = 0) was 19.5 percent. Going from zero to N50 reduced the take-
up rate by nearly 4 percentage points, to 15.8 percent, and at the highest price of
N100, the take-up rate was 12.3 percent. Women selected to receive the subsidy were
much more likely to take-up the screening program. Relative to the take-up rate of
13.8 percent in the control group, participation among women selected to receive the
subsidy was about 4.2 percentage points higher. The impact of price does not appear
to be different across the subsidy treatment and control groups (see Figure 4.4). Later
on, we formally test for interaction effects between both interventions.
One advantage of a randomized experiment is that, when successful, it limits the
need for high-powered econometrics in order to estimate treatment effects. Because
random assignment solves the selection problem, a simple difference of means suffices
to estimate the average treatment effect of the intervention. In Table 4.4 column 1,
we run what is essentially the OLS analogue of a difference of means; we regress take-
up of the screening program on Treatment 1 (price) and Treatment 2 (subsidy) in a
model with no covariates. Because both treatments are orthogonal, we can include
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both of them in the same model and still identify their separate impacts.19 Not
surprisingly, the results from column 1 are essentially identical to the difference of
means. The results suggest that a N10 increase in price reduced take-up by about 0.7
percentage points while women in the subsidy group were about 4 percentage points
more likely to participate in the screening program.
In columns 2-6, we report results from variants of the following basic model:
Takeupij = β0 + β1Pricej + β2Subsidyj +Xij + εij
Where X is a vector of control variables that include individual and household
characteristics.
In column 2 we present results from a parsimonious model in which we include
just a basic set of demographic variables while in column 3 we include an extensive set
of control variables including interviewer fixed effects. In the interest of space we do
not report coefficients on all the variables included in the model, many of which were
statistically insignificant (detailed results are available from the author on request).
In column 4 we estimate a probit model and report marginal effects20 and in column 5
we estimate a linear model with household random effects. Reported standard errors
are robust to intra-household correlation. Across all specifications, the results are
nearly identical to those obtained from a simple difference of means. The estimated
impacts are robust to including more (or less) covariates or even any at all. They
are also robust to a variety of different specifications. This again suggests that our
randomization was successful. In column 6, we formally test for interaction between
both price and the cancer treatment subsidy. We find no evidence of an interaction
effect, which is consistent with the evidence from Figure 4.4.
Overall, the results are remarkably consistent: a N10 increase in the price of
screening reduced take-up by between 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points; and selection to
receive the cancer treatment subsidy, should it prove necessary, increased the take-up
rate by about 4 percentage points – a nearly 30 percent increase in the take-up rate
of the screening program.
Another consistent finding that holds across specifications is that older women
were significantly more likely to participate in the screening program. The effect
appears to be diminishing with age though the higher order term is statistically
insignificant. A 5 year increase in age is predicted to increase participation in the
19This also reduces the residual variance.
20Marginal effects are estimated at the mean.
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program by about 2 percentage points. This at first glance might seem puzzling
because economic theory would seem to suggest the opposite. The Grossman model
of health capital accumulation for example predicts that health investments should
decline with age because of the shorter payoff period (Grossman, 1972). Kenkel
(1994) discusses the countervailing effect of health risk increasing with age which
should increase consumption of health care. There are at least two other explanations
for this finding. (1) Older women may face lower opportunity costs. They are less
likely to have younger children who need to be looked after while the woman visits
the health care center for screening. From our data, they are also more likely to
report being self-employed which suggests that they probably have more flexibility in
terms of arranging their schedule. (2) There are psychological costs associated with
cervical screening because of the intimate nature of the vaginal examination that is
required. Older women may face lower psychological costs for example because of
prior experience with childbirth.
One problem with the strategy we employed is that the interviewers were not
blinded to the price received by each household. Even though they did not know
ex ante what the price would be, once it was revealed to the household, it was also
revealed to the interviewer. It is therefore possible that the interviewers attempted
to compensate in cases where the household drew a higher price. If the interviewers
realized that women receiving a higher price would be less likely to come for screening,
they might have tried extra hard to persuade them to participate. To address this
concern, we look at the average time spent on each interview. If the interviewers
worked extra hard to persuade women who had an “unlucky” draw, then we would
expect that they would spend more time on average with women receiving a higher
price than with women receiving a lower price.
In Table 4.5, we regress interview time on price, with price entered as a continuous
variable (column1). We do not find a significant correlation between price received
and time spent on the interview. However, when we specify price as a binary variable
such that we are comparing women who received a positive price to women who drew
the free price, we find statistically significant evidence that the interviewers spent on
average two minutes extra with women receiving a positive price (column 2). When we
specify price as a categorical variable, we find the largest impact for women drawing
N50 (column 3). On average, compared to women drawing the zero price, interviews
with women drawing N50 lasted three minutes longer. This results persists even after
controlling for a broad range of individual and household characteristics. This is a
rather interesting finding and is consistent with a model in which interviewers allocate
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effort (proxied by time) in such a way as to maximize total turnout for screening. The
interviewers should rationally allocate their effort (subject to some constraint)21 such
that the marginal product of effort is equal across all three price groups. If the
women receiving the lowest price are more likely to come for screening anyway, then
the interviewers should rationally allocate more effort to women drawing a positive
price. One might expect that the marginal return to effort would be largest amongst
the middle group because more women in that group are likely to be on the margin
of participating, which would explain why the interviewers would spend more time
on average with this group.
The next question is, does this affect our experimental estimates? In Table 4.6, we
repeat the analysis in Table 4.4 column 3 but include interview time as a covariate.
The experimental impacts are exactly the same and even though the sign on interview
time is in the expected direction, it is statistically insignificant. We conclude therefore
that while the interviewers may have spent more time trying to persuade women with
an “unlucky” draw to participate in the screening program, this does not appear to
have made a difference.
4.7 Other considerations
4.7.1 Non-linearities in price
Because we have three price points, we can test for non-linear impacts of price.
The evidence on this is mixed in the literature. Kremer and Miguel (2007) find that
conditional on being charged a positive price, take-up of deworming medication does
not vary with price while Cohen and Dupas (2007) show that the effect of price
on take-up of insecticide-treated bed nets among pregnant women is increasing in
price. In Table 4.7, we enter price as a categorical variable (N50 is the omitted price
category). Overall we find evidence more in keeping with Kremer and Miguel (2007)
than with Cohen and Dupas (2007). More of the impact appears to be between N0
and N50. Going from zero to N50 reduces take-up of screening by about 5 percentage
points (statistically significant at p < 0.1) while going from N50 to N100 reduces
take-up by about 3 percentage points. However we cannot reject the null that both
coefficients are equal (F-statistic = 0.19). It is likely that in practice, the impact of
price is going to be product and/or service-specific.
21The constraint might be completing a given number of interviews per day.
76
4.7.2 Is price a targeting mechanism?
To explore this question, we constructed a measure of subjective risk. Our reason-
ing here is that women who perceive themselves as having the most need for screening
should be women who perceive themselves as having a higher risk of developing cer-
vical cancer. To measure this subjective risk, we showed women a physical scale and
asked them to mark on the scale where they thought they fell in terms of their prob-
ability of ever developing cervical cancer. This type of scale is used in the Health
and Retirement Study and has been shown to have good construct validity (see Hurd
and McGarry, 1995). The scale ranged from 0-100 with 0 representing absolutely no
chance of ever developing cervical cancer and 100 signifying absolute certainty that
they would develop cervical cancer. One can think of this kind of scale as representing
the individual’s perception of her subjective risk probability. We rescaled the vari-
able to range between 0 and 1. The distribution of this risk measure in our sample is
shown in Figure 4.5. The mean was 0.19.22
We divide the risk probabilities into quartiles and in Table 4.8 we present the
distribution of price for each risk quartile conditional on take-up of screening. We
find that conditional on take-up, 34% of women in the highest risk quartile were
willing to pay the highest price of N100 compared to 18% of women in the lowest
risk quartile. These results certainly seem suggestive but we cannot reject the null
that the distribution is the same. An important caveat though is that we have really
small sample sizes. When we include this risk measure in the regression model, the
coefficient is positive suggesting that women with higher subjective risk were more
likely to participate in screening, but it is statistically insignificant. The interaction
with price is also statistically insignificant. Overall we find no evidence that women
with the highest subjective risk have the highest willingness to pay.
We chose to use a subjective measure rather than an objective measure of risk
for several reasons: first only about 9 percent of women screened (less than 2% of
the total sample) had a positive test result and because the number is so small, we
cannot use a positive test result as a measure of risk. In addition, pre-cancerous
cervical lesions are for the most part asymptomatic, meaning that the woman does
not feel “sick” and so arguably the most salient measure of perceived risk is the
woman’s self-reported probability. We find a similar pattern of results when we use
22The age-standardized lifetime risk of developing cervical cancer is approximately 5% for Brazil
and Peru (see Sasieni and Adams (1999). It is probably higher in Nigeria. This suggests that
while women may be overestimating their risk of developing cervical cancer, they are not not wildly
overestimating it.
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a different measure of risk - the number of lifetime sexual partners per woman.23
4.7.3 Heterogenous treatment effects
There is growing recognition in the health economics literature of the importance
of heterogeneity in treatment effects (see Heckman et al., 1997; Bitler et al., 2005,
for discussions). The experimental impacts we have estimated in this paper represent
average treatment effects but it is likely that both treatments (price and the subsidy)
will have different impacts for different groups of individuals. In this section we
consider, to quote Marianne Bitler, “what mean impacts might be missing”. We
explicitly consider heterogeneity along several potentially important dimensions - age,
schooling, health status, prior knowledge about cervical screening, and household
wealth. We interact both price and subsidy with continuous measures of age and
years of schooling and with discrete variables for self-reported health status, prior
knowledge of cervical screening and a proxy for household wealth. To measure health
status, we asked women to assess their health on a 5-point scale from 1 (Excellent)
to 5 (Poor). In the regressions which follow, we collapse this variable and compare
those reporting fair health or worse to those reporting good health or better.
To assess prior knowledge about cervical screening, we asked women whether they
had heard about cervical screening before the start of the program. This is a binary
variable equal to one if the answer was yes. Lastly we proxy for household wealth
using a measure of household self-reported income. We asked women to estimate total
household income from all sources (the interviewer was asked to enumerate various
sources of income including remittances from abroad) and to limit measurement error
we asked the women to simply say whether it fell within a given range. As we show
in Table 4.9, Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 this correlates in the expected way with
commonly used measures of wealth including possession of durable assets and other
characteristics of the household and should therefore be a reasonable proxy. We
collapse this measure into three categories: households reporting incomes <N10000,
households reporting incomes between N10000 and N40000 and households reporting
incomes >N40000. Results are in Table 4.12. Overall, the only statistically significant
finding is that women from the richest households have lower price elasticities. At
a given price, women belonging to the richest households were about 0.2 percentage
points more likely to participate in the screening program than women from the
poorest households.
23There is only very small variation in this measure and so the woman’s self-assessed subjective
risk is the preferred measure.
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4.8 Discussion
We find not surprisingly that higher prices reduce take-up of the screening program
but we do not find per se a discontinuity at zero. We note however that though we
do not find evidence of a drastic decline in take-up when we go from zero to a small
positive price (at least over the range of price in the data), like Holla and Kremer
(2009), we argue this might be a bit misleading. If we assume that the impact of price
is linear over a substantial portion of the price distribution, and over the range of price
in this study it appears to be linear, then our estimates imply that increasing the price
to about N300 would reduce demand for screening to essentially zero. This is still only
a fraction of the true cost of providing cervical cancer screening.24 Estimates from
the supplementary appendix of Goldie et al. (2005) for Kenya, which one assumes is
probably not too different from Nigeria, suggest that the cost of providing screening
using VIA is around $30 (in 2000 international dollars). This includes only cost
of labor and materials and ignores all other costs (for example the cost of treating
complications arising from treatment). All else equal, it suggests that subsidies are
likely going to be needed if wide coverage is an important policy goal.
The experimental impacts we find are both qualitatively and quantitatively im-
portant. A N10 increase in price reduces take-up of cervical screening by between 0.7
and 0.8 percentage points. Going from a price of zero to a price of N50 reduces par-
ticipation by about 4 percentage points - a roughly 20 percent decline. Our estimates
imply a price elasticity around -0.2. This not surprisingly is lower than the price
elasticity of -0.6 reported in Ashraf et al. (2007). As we argued earlier, there is likely
to be greater substitutability for a water disinfectant product compared to cervical
cancer screening. Unlike Cohen and Dupas (2007), over the price range observed in
this study, we do not find take-up declining at an increasing rate; instead, our findings
can be interpreted as being more in keeping with Kremer and Miguel (2007) who find
that conditional on the price being positive, higher prices do not have a significant
impact on take-up. In keeping with the rest of the literature we find, at best, only
very weak evidence that price serves to allocate the health good to those with the
most need.
Another important contribution this paper makes is by testing the hypothesis that
concerns about affordability of treatment contribute to the low take-up of screening.
Even though the probability of being diagnosed with cervical cancer is very small,
24Where screening is available in Nigeria, it costs up to N5000, though presumably the true cost
of providing the service is much less.
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previous work has shown that human beings tend to overestimate the likelihood of
occurrence of improbable events (see an overview of some of this literature in Mc-
Fadden, 1999). Consistent with this, we find that women in our sample, on average,
appear to overestimate their probability of developing cervical cancer. This is not a
new finding (see ?).
We find that the take-up rate is about 4 percentage points higher among women
who are offered a conditional treatment subsidy - to be paid out only in the event
that they are diagnosed with invasive cancer. From this we conclude that even though
screening itself reduces the risk of developing cervical cancer, there is evidence that
concerns about affordability of treatment in the unlikely event of being diagnosed
with cervical cancer contribute to low take-up of cervical screening.
One concern we had about the subsidy was that for it to work, it had to be
credible. Women had to believe that if diagnosed with the disease they would actually
receive the subsidy, because it was essentially a promise. We were concerned that in
this environment where people are generally distrustful of promises – especially for a
program associated with the government – that we would not find an effect simply
because women were skeptical. As the results show, our fears were unfounded. It is
important to note though that our estimates can be interpreted as a lower bound on
the true effect if at least some women did not participate in screening because they
did not believe they would receive the subsidy.
4.9 Conclusion
Lack of generalizability is often mentioned as one problem with field experiments.
Many of the field experiments in developing countries are small-scale and regional
and critics often argue that results from these experiments may not apply to other
places and at other times (see for example Rodrik, 2008). Duflo (2006) in response to
this critique makes a compelling case for replication of field experiments in different
settings (see also Imbens, 2009). In this study we explicitly link our work to previously
done work in other countries and compare/contrast our findings. Overall, we find
results that are broadly consistent with the work of others in this field. We also make
an important contribution by estimating the impact of a conditional cancer treatment
subsidy. An important takeaway from this paper is that even though price has an
important effect on take-up of screening, clearly it is not the whole story, because
even among women who received a zero price, the take-up rate was still only 20
percent. It is likely that distance and travel costs still remained a significant barrier
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and contributed to the low participation rates. We did not attempt to influence those
costs except indirectly by reducing the total cost of screening. Another reason that is
often cited as contributing to low rates of screening is cultural factors. We attempted
to take those into account by recruiting only female interviewers and female nurses to
conduct the screening. We acknowledge though that there might be other dimensions
along which cultural factors might come into play. We hope that in future work we
will be able to tackle some of these alternative explanations.
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Figure 4.1: Price Distribution
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Subsidy
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Figure 4.3: Kernel Density
Table 4.1: Joint distribution
No Yes
Free 175 200 375
N50 178 182 360
N100 182 160 342
535 542 1077
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Figure 4.4: Was there an interaction effect?
Figure 4.5: Distribution of subjective risk probability
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Years of schooling 9.1 5.1
Employed 0.70 0.46
Prior knowledge of cervical screening 0.34 0.47
Spouse age (if married) 42.3 21.8
Religion (Christian=1) 0.90 0.31
Ever smoked 0.01 0.08
Self-reported health status (Excellent=1) 0.31 0.46
Health care visits over the last 12 months 1.6 3.2
Ever pregnant 0.81 0.39
Household size 5.1 2.0
Number of bedrooms 2.2 1.3
Main source of drinking water (pipe-borne water) 0.23 0.42
Main source of cooking fuel (firewood) 0.64 0.48
Percentage of Households with bednet 0.28 0.45
Percentage of Households that use flush toilet 0.19 0.40
Percentage of Households with Television 0.81 0.39
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Table 4.3: Was randomization successful?
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Price SE Subsidy SE
Age -.12 (.15) -.004* (.0018)
Married 2.2 (3.7) -.019 (.045)
Schooling .033 (.35) -.006 (.0044)
Employed 6.6 4.0 -.058 (.05)
Religion (Christian=1) -7.5 (4.2) .063 (.052)
Number of sick days (last 30 days) .074 (.6) .014 (.0074)
Have ever been pregnant -2.6 (5.0) .10 (.061)
Prior knowledge of cervical screening -.68 (2.9) .051 (.036)
Self-reported risk of developing cancer .046 (.074) .002 (.0009)
Self-reported income (None) 3.6 (7.3) .007 (.09)
Self-reported income (< N5000) -8.3 (5.6) -.084 (.069)
Self-reported income (N5k–N10k) .20 (5.4) -.038 (.067)
Self-reported income (N10k–N20k) -2.2 (5.6) -.024 (.069)
Household Size -1.0 (.72) -.018* (.009)
Number of bedrooms 3.3 (5.0) .032 (.062)
Report owning a bednet -3.7 (3.0) .056 (.037)
Report owning a power generator 6.1 (3.6) -.031 (.045)
Report owning a refrigerator -.38 (3.0) -.055 (.037)
Type of toilet (Water closet) 1.5 (4.0) .17** (.05)




Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All regressions include interviewer fixed effects
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Table 4.4: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Random Effects OLS
Price -.00074*** -.0007** -.00077*** -.0078*** -.00076*** -.00065*
(.00028) (.00028) (.00028) (.00028) (.00029) (.00038)
Subsidy .038* .039* .038* .037* .036 .048
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.038)
Age .0043*** .0039*** .0039*** .004*** .0042***
(.0012) (.0013) (.0011) (.0012) (.0012)
Married .016 .023 .021 .022 .018
(.027) (.029) (.026) (.028) (.028)
Schooling .0041 .0037 .0029 .0031 .0034
(.0027) (.0033) (.0027) (.0031) (.0032)
Employed -.045 -.04 -.046 -.047 -.047
(.031) (.034) (.034) (.034) (.034)
Religion .033 .036 .036 .032 .037
(.037) (.033) (.033) (.034) (.034)
Price x Subsidy -.00021
(.00057)
Basic set of controls No Yes
Includes interviewer fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
N 1042 1032 1025 1031 1031 1031
r2 .0099 .028 .047 .045
F 5.2 2.9 2.4 2.6
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Price = N50 2.6***
(.97)
Price = N100 .90
(.99)
age .07* .07* .065
(.042) (.042) (.042)
Schooling -.018 -.021 -.027
(.1) (.1) (.1)
Married 2.2** 2.3** 2.3**
(.98) (.98) (.98)
Employed -.28 -.27 -.14
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1)
N 1016 1016 1016
r2 .16 .16 .17
F 7.9 8.1 7.9
All models include an extensive list of controls
including interviewer fixed effects
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Omitted price category is N50
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01










Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Omitted price category is N50
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Table 4.8: Risk Quartiles
Risk Quartiles Free N50 N100 Total
1st quartile 21 20 9 50
2nd quartile 15 14 11 40
3rd quartile 21 11 8 40
4th quartile 16 11 14 41
Total 73 56 42 171
Pearson chi2(6) = 5.8 Pr = 0.44
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Table 4.9: Toilet facility is water closet
Water closet
Household’s total monthly income No Yes Total
Less than N5000 92.4 7.6 100.0
N5,000-N10,000 90.5 9.5 100.0
N10,000-N20,000 88.6 11.4 100.0
N20,000-N40,000 80.5 19.5 100.0
N40,000-N60,000 66.4 33.6 100.0
More than N60,000 62.1 37.9 100.0
Total 81.4 18.6 100.0
Table 4.10: Does any member of this Household have a bank account?
Bank account
Household’s total monthly income No Yes Total
Less than N5000 56.6 43.4 100.0
N5,000-N10,000 55.3 44.7 100.0
N10,000-N20,000 49.1 50.9 100.0
N20,000-N40,000 33.3 66.7 100.0
N40,000-N60,000 21.6 78.4 100.0
More than N60,000 16.5 83.5 100.0
Total 41.1 58.9 100.0
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Table 4.11: Does any member of this Household own an electric generator?
Generator
Household’s total monthly income No Yes Total
Less than N5000 88.3 11.7 100.0
N5,000-N10,000 87.2 12.8 100.0
N10,000-N20,000 86.5 13.5 100.0
N20,000-N40,000 85.1 14.9 100.0
N40,000-N60,000 68.1 31.9 100.0
More than N60,000 53.2 46.8 100.0
Total 80.1 19.9 100.0
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Schooling x Price -3.1e-05 (7.6e-05)
Poor health .024 (.076)
Poor health x Price .0007 (.001)
Income2 (N10-N40k) -.018 (.057)
Income3 (> N40k) -.11* (.061)
Income2 x Price .0006 (.0007)
Income3 x Price .002*** (.0007)
Aware of screening .012 (.052)
Aware x Price 7.8e-05 (.0006)
Subsidy x Age .0027 (.0023)
Subsidy x Schooling .006 (.0062)
Subsidy x Poor health -.0079 (.082)
Subsidy x Income2 .036 (.057)
Subsidy x Income3 .0074 (.062)





Standard errors in parentheses




In this dissertation I have examined some of the factors commonly mentioned as
contributing to health professional migration. In my first paper I introduce a new
dataset on physician migration from more than 30 sub-Saharan African countries to
the US and the UK. I exploit the panel nature of this dataset to derive quantitative
estimates of the importance of economic shocks. I find that - in this case at least - the
perceived wisdom appears to be right: physician migration does respond to changes
in economic conditions. My estimates suggest that a one percentage point decline
in lagged growth increases physician out-migration by approximately 0.3 percent. In
the IV models, a one percentage point decline in lagged growth increases physician
out-migration by between 3.4 and 3.6 percent. Even though I argue that economic
shocks affect physician migration directly through earnings, and indirectly by chang-
ing expectations about future earnings, I cannot test these hypotheses using the data
I have. I therefore leave this for future work.
In my second paper, I look directly at the impact of doctors’ earnings. I exploit
a natural experiment in Ghana to derive estimates of the impact of increasing doc-
tors’ salaries. I find that the ADHA program which increased salaries of doctors in
Ghana by between 75-150 percent appears to have reduced migration of physicians
from Ghana. By 2004, six years after the program was introduced, the foreign mi-
grant stock of Ghanaian doctors had reduced by between 10-13 percent depending
on the assumptions one is willing to make. The cost-effectiveness of this program is
unclear though. The starting budget for the program was around $1.6 million.1 If
we increase this by 10 percent every year to account for inflation, then by 2004, the
government would have spent approximately $11,384,605. This translates to approx-
imately $113,846 per physician retained. Admittedly, these are crude estimates and
1Later on the budget ballooned because the government expanded the program to include other
health professionals.
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fail to take into account a number of different things including the spillover effects on
other health professionals but if anything, we are more than likely underestimating
the cost of the program. It certainly raises questions about the cost-effectiveness of
a program to increase doctors’ salaries.
The generalizability of our findings is unclear but we do find a similar effect when
we take a quick look at a different country, Tanzania, which implemented a similar
program. This suggests that our findings are likely to hold up if one evaluates other
programs elsewhere. There is however, still a lot of room for more research on this
topic. In addition to obtaining estimates of the impact of doctors’ earnings, future
work can help clarify what aspects of such programs are important or even, whether
programs that utilize non-financial incentives will prove to be more cost-effective.
In my third paper, I examine the demand for preventive care. I show that price
is clearly an important determinant of take-up but I also show that, at least in the
case of cervical cancer screening, the cost of treatment for the cervical cancer, an
admittedly unlikely event, also affects take-up of cervical screening. I also make
two additional contributions; I test for evidence of a discontinuity at zero (I find
none), and investigate whether women with the most need are also those with the
highest willingness to pay, which would be consistent with price acting as a screening





Comparison between CPD (2008) and Okeke
(2008)
In order to compare both datasets, the data is truncated in the year 2000 i.e. all
migration flows occurring after the year 2000 are excluded. Since the CPD captures
emigration as of the year 2000, by restricting the sample to exclude emigration oc-
curring after 2000, it is possible to make both datasets roughly comparable. Despite
the differences in definition and methodology, the overall similarities are striking. In
the table below I summarize the key differences between both datasets. In Table A.2
migration numbers are compared side by side for each country in the sample and
in Figure A.1 and figure A.2 I plot my data against theirs (in logs). If the data
were identical then the plot should be a 45-degree line. Notice the strong correlation
between both datasets. For the US, both data sets are for all intents and purposes
identical, and even for the UK, the degree of correlation is quite strong.
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Figure A.1: Correlation (US Migration)
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Figure A.2: Correlation (UK Migration)
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Figure A.3: Fraction of African Physicians abroad (US and UK combined)
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Table A.1: Summary of differences











Migrant doctor is de-
fined based on country
of birth (does not mat-
ter where training was
received)
Migrant doctor is defined
based on country of med-
ical training i.e. where
qualification was received
Excludes 12 countries with-
out a medical school i.e.
Botswana, Djibouti, Cape
Verde, Comoros, Equato-
rial Guinea, Eritrea, Gam-
bia, Lesotho, Mauritania,





two receiving countries -
the US and the UK
Excludes countries with
zero migration to the US
and the UK. Excludes
5 more countries; Burk-




Table A.2: Comparison of both datasets
country US(1) US(2) UK(1) UK(2)
Angola 2 0 1 16
Benin 6 4 0 0
Burundi 8 0 0 5
Cameroon 110 170 19 49
Congo 0 15 0 11
Cote D’Ivoire 0 10 1 0
DRC 32 90 3 37
Ethiopia 482 420 39 65
Ghana 801 850 460 590
Guinea 6 15 0 3
Kenya 450 865 143 2733
Liberia 64 105 27 10
Madagascar 16 30 0 6
Malawi 8 40 14 191
Mali 0 15 0 0
Mauritius 53 35 0 294
Mozambique 5 20 3 16
Niger 3 10 0 0
Nigeria 2991 2510 2754 1997
Rwanda 5 25 0 4
Senegal 7 40 1 0
Seychelles 4 0 0 29
Sierra Leone 61 115 1 118
Somalia 38 70 1 53
South Africa 2855 1950 10707 3509
Sudan 0 65 892 606
Tanzania 202 270 74 743
Togo 4 10 0 0
Uganda 217 290 117 1136
Zambia 106 130 160 465
Zimbabwe 210 235 213 553
Total 8746 8404 15630 13239
Source: Okeke dataset (1) and Clemens dataset (2)
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APPENDIX B
Data Sources for Chapter III
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Table B.1: OECD countries and data sources
Country Data source Definition Available data
Australia Australian Bureau of Census Country of birth 1991, 1996, 2001
Austria Statistik Austria Country of birth 1991, 2001
Belgium Institut National de Statistiques Country of birth 1991, 2001
Canada Canadian Medical Association Country of qualification 1994-2004
Denmark Statistics Denmark Country of birth 2004, 2005
France French Medical Association Country of qualification 1991-2004
Germany German Medical Association Country of citizenship 1991-2004
Ireland Central Statistical Office Country of birth 1991, 2002
Italy Instituto nazionale di statistica Country of citizenship 1991
New Zealand New Zealand Medical Association Country of qualification 1991, 2004
Norway Norway Medical Association Country of qualification 2004
Portugal Ordem dos medicos - Lisboa Country of citizenship 2002, 2003
Sweden Statistics Sweden Country of birth 1991, 2003
Switzerland Office Federal de la Statistique Country of citizenship 1991, 2000
UK General Medical Council Country of qualification 1991-2004
USA American Medical Association Country of qualification 1991-2004
Source: Reproduced from Table 1 in Docquier and Bhargava (2007)
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APPENDIX C
Visual Inspection with Acetic Acid
Visual Inspection with acetic acid (VIA) is an alternative method of cervical cancer
screening which is rapidly gaining traction in developing countries. It has similar
sensitivity to the more well-known Pap smear but is much less resource intensive.
It involves a visual examination of the cervix and application of 3-5% acetic acid
solution which turns areas with cervical dysplasia white, making them more visible.
One advantage of this method is that one can adopt a screen and treat approach
where women receive screening and treatment (of precancerous lesions) during the
same visit. This method of screening is effective; it is safe and it is more affordable for
women in poorer countries. There are several methods for treatment of pre-cancerous
lesions: (1) Methods that destroy abnormal tissue e.g. cryotherapy (80-90% effective),
cold coagulation, laser vaporization. (2) Methods that remove abnormal tissue e.g.
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